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Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2004 09:09:52 -0700 From: Craig Paterson <craigp@...pett.com> To: pressinfo@...bold.com Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes pressinfo@...bold.com wrote: > <>In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail@....securityfocus.com> > > In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic > record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting > machine following an election. The results from each individual > machine are then tabulated, and thoroughly audited during the standard > election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official > winners are announced. Any alleged changes to a vote count in the > election management software would be immediately discovered during > this audit process, as this total would not match the true official > total tabulated from each machine. Something with a legitimate purpose may not always be used in a legitimate fashion. If "legitimate" features exist which could pervert the primary purpose of the system -- to accurately record and collate votes -- and those features could forseeably be used in such a way with the collusion of only a small number of individuals, then that system is broken. Your second point here has got nothing to do with security of the GEMS software -- it's talking about election processes as a whole, of which the software is only a part. The assumption in the design and implementation of your voting machines and software should be that the other parts of the process might *not* work, not that they are perfect and will excuse any flaws in your system. Craig.
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