bugtraq - Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

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Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2004 14:32:12 -0400
From: Gene Cronk <gcronk@...g.net>
To: Polazzo Justin <Justin.Polazzo@...ilities.gatech.edu>
Cc: pressinfo@...bold.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor   
 Account    Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes


Polazzo Justin wrote:

> 
> If we don't have any data, then we are making decisions based on
> propaganda, no matter what side you listen to.
> 
> Of course California suing then does raise questions :) Any state that
> implements voting technology that has not been verified by independent
> means needs rethink their approach. Any state could use the resources at
> their disposal to evaluate these systems independently at a very low
> cost, if any at all. (preferably by some local Tech school :)
> 
> Either way, without POC, how can we discuss this on bugtraq?
> 
> -JP
> 
> P.s.: 
> 
> Even though MS sux out of box, you can turn off the netlogon process on
> any windows client, voiding any authentication to the local workstation.
> The only authentication that can take place is server based, which can
> then be further be restricted through policies and reghacks to kerberos
> only. If you then delete the domain accounts as the card is used fears
> of locally compromising the systems would be a non issue.
> 
> While I am pretty sure this has not been done, it illustrates why we
> need to evaluate the code.
> 

http://www.why-war.com/features/2003/10/diebold.html

My question is, why would Diebold attempt to enact the DMCA if they 
didn't have something to hide?  I completely agree that propaganda 
should not be listened to from either side, something smells very fishy 
here.

Also agreed on the server authentication, but what happens if I happen 
to get a copy of that Access DB and throw it on another computer?  If an 
electronic trail isn't there, a paper trail should be.

For a more mainstream article on this subject, you can also check out 
the NYT:

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/19/politics/campaign/19vote.html?pagewanted=print&position=

As far as a POC and a local tech school auditing the code, I'm all for 
it, but the campaign contributions aren't.

-- 
Gene Cronk - ISSAP,CISSP,NSA-IAM (gcronk@...g.net)
The Robin Shepherd Group -- Systems Administrator
Office: (904)-359-0981 Ext. 36
Cell: (386)-795-3081  Web: http://www.trsg.net