bugtraq - Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 01:33:05 +0000
From: "Enrique A. Chaparro" <echaparro@...sinectis.com.ar>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor
 Account    Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

On Fri, 24 Sep 2004 10:01:59 -0400
Claudius Li <aprentic@...tae.net> wrote:

CL> 
CL> So my question is, given that this seems to be a solved problem why is
CL> there so much debate on finding the solution? Surely I am missing
CL> something obvious.
CL> 

Might seem to be, but it is _not_ a solved problem. Despite some 
computationally secure protocols exist (some of them more recent 
and slightly less cumbersome than those explained in Bruce's book),
the _practical_ implementation of such protocols is still extremely
complex, if even possible for large scale elections.

First objection is: 
(a) if you're going to vote `remotely' (e.g., thru Internet) you have
no assurance at all that the `voting station' (i.e., voter's computer)
has not been tampered with. A well crafted worm, even if it exploits
well known vulnerabilities (users do not apply security patches very
often), may completely change the electio's result.
(b) if you are going to vote `locally' (i.e., using an `official'
voting station under election officials physical control), you still
have the same `blackbox' problems with the software _and_ all the
burden associated with cryptographic keys generation and distribution.

Second objection is:
Even if you were able to overcome the first objection (wich, in case 
"b" above, will solve the issue for simpler methods), a secure system
 requires _huge_ amounts of computing power (if you're thinking of large
scale elections, i.e. elections involving millions of voters)

Regards,

Enrique

-- 
``Izena duen guzia omen da.''

Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped