Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 22:46:14 +0200
From: OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2005.010] OpenPKG Security Advisory (openpkg)


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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@...npkg.org                         openpkg@...npkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2005.010                                          10-Jun-2005
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             openpkg
Vulnerability:       arbitrary file mode modification,
                     arbitrary path writing,
                     denial of service
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:           Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= openpkg-20050609-20050609 >= openpkg-20050610-20050610
OpenPKG 2.3          <= openpkg-2.2.2-2.2.2       >= openpkg-2.2.3-2.2.3
OpenPKG 2.2          <= openpkg-2.3.1-2.3.1       >= openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2

Dependent Packages:  none

Description:
  The vulnerabilities described by this text affect the OpenPKG
  bootstrap package's GZip and BZip2 embedded software. Similar
  advisories [0][1] describe the same vulnerabilities, although in
  context of the particular vendor software.

  According to a Debian bug report [2], Ulf Harnhammar discovered an
  input validation error in the GZip data compressor [3]. Because
  gzip(1) fails to properly validate file paths during decompression
  with the "-N" argument, a remote attacker using a malicious archive
  could corrupt arbitrary files with the privileges of the user that
  is running gzip(1). The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
  project assigned the identifier CAN-2005-1228 [4] to this problem.

  According to a BugTraq posting [5], Imran Ghory discovered a time
  of check time of use (TOCTOU) file mode vulnerability in the BZip2
  data compressor [6]. Because bzip2(1) does not safely restore the
  mode of a file undergoing compression or decompression, a malicious
  user can potentially change the mode of any file belonging to the
  user running bzip2(1). The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
  project assigned the identifier CAN-2005-0953 [7] to this problem.

  In a unrelated BZip2 problem, a denial of service vulnerability
  was found in both the bzip2(1) program and its associated library
  libbz2(3). Specially crafted BZip2 archives lead to an infinite loop
  in the decompressor which results in an indefinitively large output
  file. This could be exploited to cause disk space exhaustion. The
  Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the
  identifier CAN-2005-1260 [8] to this problem.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
  rpm -q openpkg". If the openpkg package version is affected (see
  above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see Solution)
  [9][10].

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [11][12], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [13][14] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [15], build a corresponding binary
  RPM from it [9] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  binary RPM [10]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.3, perform the
  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  other releases adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/2.3/UPD
  ftp> get openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0]  http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.008-bzip2.html
  [1]  http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.009-gzip.html
  [2]  http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=305255
  [3]  http://www.gzip.org/
  [4]  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1228
  [5]  http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111229375217633
  [6]  http://sources.redhat.com/bzip2/
  [7]  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0953
  [8]  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1260
  [9]  http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [10] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [11] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.3/UPD/openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
  [12] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/openpkg-2.2.3-2.2.3.src.rpm
  [13] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.3/UPD/
  [14] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
  [15] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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