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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2005 18:40:42 -0500 From: James Longstreet <jlongs2@....edu> To: Derek Martin <code@...zashack.org> Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Re: On classifying attacks -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Jul 14, 2005, at 9:39 PM, Derek Martin wrote: > This kind of attack has a name already: it is a trojan horse. <snip> > But is this a remote exploit? No, it's not an exploit at all. Systems are not vulnerable to it unless a local user runs an executable. The only thing it exploits is trust of email (or similar vector). Your example involving BIND is a good example of a true remote exploit. A local exploit is typically categorized as one that requires permissions on the system to begin with, and is used to gain elevated permissions (such as exploiting a setuid program, or causing root to write files through symlink race conditions). This leaves one significant class of vulnerabilities, however. Let's imagine for a moment that there is a buffer overflow in libjpeg that allows an attacker to create a malicious JPEG which can cause any program using libjpeg to execute arbitrary code. This should be classified as a remote vulnerability. Users should be able to trust that opening a JPEG file will only cause certain code to run, namely decoding and displaying that JPEG. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (Darwin) iD8DBQFC2El6TYcj5d9bqjoRAsMcAKCKXn5l/B7WH4B49JIidvCXz3utRgCgxIBo xXQ3xMVvvTAZZtz7jXXd12o= =EhoG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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