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Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2006 11:30:41 -0800
From: CS_Advisories Mailbox <CS_Advisories_Mailbox@...antec.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: SYMSA-2006-001:  Buffer overflow in Microsoft Office 2000, Office XP (2002), and
 Office 2003 Routing Slip Metadata

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                   Symantec Professional Services 
 
                         www.symantec.com
                        Security Advisory

Advisory ID  : SYMSA-2006-001 
Advisory Name: Buffer overflow in Microsoft Office 2000, Office XP 
               (2002), and Office 2003 Routing Slip Metadata.
Release Date : 03-14-2006 
Application  : Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft PowerPoint,
               Microsoft Outlook 
Platform     : Windows 
Severity     : Remotely exploitable / User access 
Author       : Ollie Whitehouse / ollie_whitehouse@...antec.com 
Vendor Status: Duplicated and verified by Microsoft, patch available.
CVE Number   : CVE-2006-0009 
Reference    : http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17000 


Overview: 

        There exists a buffer overflow in Microsoft Word, Excel, 
        PowerPoint, and Outlook in the parsing of the routing slip
        metadata. The result is that when a user closes a malicious 
        document, arbitrary code can be executed on the host in 
        question.


Details: 

        Microsoft Office supports the concept of routing slips. These 
        can be embedded within documents to ease the process of 
        collaborative working. During Symantec’s investigation it was 
        discovered that within the metadata of Microsoft’s document 
        format that there is both a length value and a null 
        terminated string for the different sections of a routing 
        slip. Upon further investigation it was discovered that the 
        affected applications allocate memory based on the size 
        contained within the length field, but then proceeds to copy 
        the entire string up until the null termination.

        The result in the case of Microsoft Word 2002 SP3 (fully 
        patched), is that we overwrite the saved return address on 
        the stack with a Unicode value. This can be used to obtain 
        control of the execution within the program.

        Microsoft Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook all behave 
        slightly differently and in the case of Office 2003, it 
        appears that the values move from the stack to the heap 
        which makes exploitation more complicated, yet not impossible.


Vendor Response:

        The above vulnerability was addressed by Microsoft Security 
        Bulletin MS06-012. For details see 
        http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS06-012.mspx
 
        If there are any further questions about this statement, 
        please contact Microsoft support.

Recommendation:
        Apply the patch supplied by Microsoft according to your 
        organization's software maintenance test and deployment 
        procedures.

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:

        The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has 
        assigned the following names to these issues.  These are 
        candidates for inclusion in the CVE list 
        (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for 
        security problems.


        CVE-2006-0009


- -------Symantec Consulting Services Advisory Information-------

For questions about this advisory, or to report an error:
cs_advisories@...antec.com

For details on Symantec's Vulnerability Reporting Policy: 
http://www.symantec.com/research/Symantec-Responsible-Disclosure.pdf

Consulting Services Advisory Archive: 
http://www.symantec.com/research/

Consulting Services Advisory PGP Key:
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es_PGP.asc

- -------------Symantec Product Advisory Information-------------

To Report a Security Vulnerability in a Symantec Product:
secure@...antec.com 

For general information on Symantec's Product Vulnerability 
reporting and response:
http://www.symantec.com/security/

Symantec Product Advisory Archive: 
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/security/SymantecAdvisories.html

Symantec Product Advisory PGP Key:
http://www.symantec.com/security/Symantec-Vulnerability-Management-Key
.asc

- ---------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright (c) 2006 by Symantec Corp.
Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted 
as long as it is not edited in any way unless authorized by 
Symantec Consulting Services. Reprinting the whole or part of 
this alert in any medium other than electronically requires 
permission from cs_advisories@...antec.com.

Disclaimer
The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the 
time of publishing based on currently available information. Use 
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS 
condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. 
Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any 
direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use 
of, or reliance on, this information.

Symantec, Symantec products, and Symantec Consulting Services are 
registered trademarks of Symantec Corp. and/or affiliated companies 
in the United States and other countries. All other registered and 
unregistered trademarks represented in this document are the sole 
property of their respective companies/owners.

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