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Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2007 15:34:48 +0300
From: 3APA3A <3APA3A@...URITY.NNOV.RU>
To: sapheal@...k.pl
Subject: Re: FreeRadius 1.1.3 SMB_Handle_Type SMB_Connect_Server arbitrary code execution
Dear sapheal@...k.pl,
Please correct me, if I wrong, but as far as I can see, 'server'
parameter is taken from module configuration.
static CONF_PARSER module_config[] = {
{ "server", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR, offsetof(rlm_smb_t,server), NULL, NULL},
{ "backup", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR, offsetof(rlm_smb_t,backup), NULL, NULL},
{ "domain", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR, offsetof(rlm_smb_t,domain), NULL, NULL},
{ NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
};
...
rcode = Valid_User(request->username->strvalue,
request->password->strvalue,
data->server, data->backup, data->domain);
That is, in order to "exploit" this vulnerability you must control
FreeRADIUS configuration file. If you can control configuration file
you can execute code in multiple ways, e.g. by specifying application
to be executed on every request. That is, there is no security impact
here.
--Tuesday, January 2, 2007, 3:10:50 PM, you wrote to bugtraq@...urityfocus.com:
shp> Synopsis:
shp> FreeRadius 1.1.3 SMB_Handle_Type SMB_Connect_Server arbitrary code execution
shp> Product: FreeRadius
shp> Version: <=1.1.3
shp> Issue:
shp> ======
shp> A critical security vulnerability has been found in FreeRadius 1.1.3.
shp> Arbitrary code execution is possible due to improper bounds-checking.
shp> Details:
shp> ========
shp> Function of the prototype:
shp> SMB_Handle_Type SMB_Connect_Server(SMB_Handle_Type Con_Handle,
shp> char *server, char *NTdomain)
shp> when initializing (con->desthost) where con is SMB_Handle_Type class
shp> object does not check for bounds.
shp> Affected Versions
shp> =================
shp> FreeRadius <=1.1.3
shp> Kind regards,
shp> Michal Bucko (sapheal)
shp> hack.pl
--
~/ZARAZA
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