bugtraq - Re: Windows DNS Cache Poisoning by Forwarder DNS Spoofing

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2007 19:58:18 -0400
From: Tim <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org>
To: "Roger A. Grimes" <roger@...neretcs.com>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Windows DNS Cache Poisoning by Forwarder DNS Spoofing

> I appreciate you replying, but I understand the Windows DNS attack well.
> I'm just wondering how and if BIND protects against the same attack, and
> if yes, how?

Well, as the main vulnerability implies, a sane DNS cache wouldn't
accept a record that wasn't requested.  If I ask for A, and I get A and
B back, and B isn't reasonably related to A, ignore B.

I'm not saying BIND is sane, but from what I understand, in this case
they got it right.  The birthday attack is merely another vector to
exploit the real problem.

tim