Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2007 11:00:13 +0200
From: RedTeam Pentesting GmbH <release@...team-pentesting.de>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX Remote Command Execution

Advisory: Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX Remote Command Execution

RedTeam Pentesting discovered a remote command execution in the
Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX during a penetration test. The masterCGI script
of the OmniPXC integrated communication solution web interface is
vulnerable to a remote command execution. Attackers can run arbitrary
commands with the permissions of the web application user.


Details
=======

Product: Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX
Affected Versions: All versions up to and including R7.1
Fixed Versions: All supported versions
Vulnerability Type: Remote Command Execution
Security-Risk: high
Vendor-URL: http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/psirt/statements.htm
            reference number 2007002
Vendor-Status: Informed, patch available
Advisory-URL: http://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2007-001.php
Advisory-Status: public
CVE: CVE-2007-3010
CVE-URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-3010


Introduction
============

"The OmniPCX Enterprise is an integrated communications solution for
medium-sized businesses and large corporations. It combines the best of
the old (legacy TDM phone connectivity) with the new (a native IP
platform and support for Session Initiation Protocol, or SIP) to provide
an effective and complete communications solution for cost-conscious
companies on the cutting edge."

(from the vendor's homepage)


More Details
============

The OmniPCX web interface has a CGI script "masterCGI" which offers a
"ping" functionality. By running the script with the parameters "ping"
and "user", one is able to ping any IP address reachable from the server
the webinterface is running on.

curl -k "https://www.example.com/cgi-bin/masterCGI?ping=nomip&user=127.0.0.1"

The ping will be done on the server, running the ping program installed
on it. The vulnerability lies in the "user" variable not being filtered
when passed to the shell. Thus, arbitrary commands can be executed on
the server by adding them to the user variable, separated by semicolons.
Spaces have to be encoded by using the internal field separator ${IFS},
as any normal or URL encoded space will abort the command execution.


Proof of Concept
================

curl -k "https://www.example.com/cgi-bin/masterCGI?ping=nomip&user=;ls\${IFS}-l;"


Workaround
==========

Deactivate the Web server at the loss of some functionality not related
to telephony service. Interpose a firewall allowing access to the web
interface of the OXE to IP addresses who should have access to the
server (e.g. maintenance technicians).


Fix
===

Correct filtering of shell meta-characters and tighter access control
have been implemented in all supported versions.


Security Risk
=============

The risk of this vulnerability is high. Any user which has access to the
web interface of the OmniPCX Enterprise solution will be able to execute
arbitrary commands on the server with the permissions of the webserver.


History
=======

2007-05-07 First contact with head of technical staff of Alcatel-Lucent. 
           Will relay the information to their technicians and call back 
           with further information.
2007-05-09 Response with a pointer to the Alcatel-Lucent PSIRT and the
           website http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/psirt, where the
           process of reporting a security vulnerability is explained.
           The advisory gets mailed to the email address provided there.
2007-05-10 Advisory gets acknowledged by the PSIRT
2007-05-23 Vulnerability gets confirmed by Alcatel-Lucent
2007-06-18 CVE number assigned
2007-09-17 Coordinated public release with Alcatel-Lucent


References
==========

http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/psirt/statements.htm
reference number 2007002


RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================

RedTeam Pentesting is offering individual penetration tests, short
pentests, performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts.
Hereby, security weaknesses in company networks or products are
uncovered and can be fixed immediately.

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security advisories.

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-- 
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Dennewartstr. 25-27                        Fax : +49 241 963-1304
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