Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2008 17:19:47 +0100
From: Adam Laurie <adam@...roup.co.uk>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: ANNOUNCE: Apache-SSL security release - apache_1.3.41+ssl_1.59

Folks,

Following information/research provided by Alexander Klink, a new 
release is out, fixing a low priority security issue as detailed below. 
The release is on the primary Apache-SSL ftp server and should hit the 
mirrors over the next few hours, according to their schedules.

See http://www.apache-ssl.org for mirrors.

Advisory follows:

============================================
||| Security Advisory AKLINK-SA-2008-005 |||
||| CVE-2008-0555 (CVE candidate)        |||
============================================

Apache-SSL memory disclosure
============================

Date released: 02.04.2008
Date reported: 17.01.2008
$Revision: 1.1 $

by Alexander Klink
    Cynops GmbH
    a.klink@...ops.de
    https://www.cynops.de/advisories/CVE-2008-0555.txt
    (S/MIME signed: 
https://www.cynops.de/advisories/CVE-2008-0555-signed.txt)
    https://www.klink.name/security/aklink-sa-2008-005-apache-ssl.txt
    http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0555

Vendor: Adam & Ben Laurie
Product: Apache-SSL
Website: http://www.apache-ssl.org
Vulnerability: memory disclosure, potential privilege escalation in web
                applications
Class: remote
Status: patched
Severity: low
Releases known to be affected: apache_1.3.34+ssl_1.57
Releases known NOT to be affected: apache_1.3.41+ssl_1.59

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Background:

Apache-SSL is a secure Webserver, based on Apache and SSLeay/OpenSSL.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Overview:

Apache-SSL provides environment variables that are filled with
(client) certificate data. If the subject of a client certificate
contains special characters, parts of these variables can be overwritten
or be filled with other parts of memory.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Technical details:

The certificate DN as returned by the OpenSSL X509_NAME_online is
passed into the following function:

static void ExpandCert(pool *p,table *pEnv,char *szPrefix, char *szDN, 
char *szCert)
     {
     char buf[HUGE_STRING_LEN];
     char *s,*t;
     /* Expand a X509_oneline entry into it's base components and register
        them as environment variables. Needed if you want to pass 
certificate
        information to CGI's. The naming convention SHOULD be fairly 
compatible
        with CGI's written for stronghold's certificate info  - Q */
     /* FIXME - strtok() and strcspn() may cause problems on some 
systems - Q */

     ap_table_setn(pEnv,szDN,ap_pstrdup(p,szCert));

     ap_cpystrn(buf,szCert,sizeof buf);
     for(s=strtok(buf,"/") ; s != NULL ; s=strtok(NULL,"/"))
         {
         int n=strcspn(s,"=");
         s[n]='\0';
         StrUpper(s);
         t=ap_pstrcat(p,szPrefix,s,NULL);
         ap_table_setn(pEnv,t,ap_pstrdup(p,s+n+1));
         }
     }

The function assumes that the relative distinguished name does not
contain a '/'. If a / is contained in for example the common name,
strcspn(s,"=") returns the size of s, so s+n+1 points beyond the
current token.
Furthermore, environment variables can be overwritten by including '/'
and '='. For example, to overwrite the OPENSSL_S_CLIENT_DN_OU variable,
one could use a certificate with a CN of "/OU=Fake OU".
If an application relies on this information to distinguish certificates
into different authorization classes, it can be fooled this way.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Communication:

* 17.01.2008: Reported the bug to Ben Laurie
* 17.01.2008: Ben replies and acknowledges the bug
* 01.02.2008: Checking back with Ben on the status
* 01.02.2008: Ben replies that he'll be looking into a patch over the 
weekend
* 06.02.2008: Ben sends patch and asks for help with testing it
* 07.02.2008: Reply with test results (still a small problem unrelated to
               the original issue)
* 09.02.2008: Ben sends updated patch
* 11.02.2008: Told Ben that patch works fine
* 18.02.2008: Requested update
* 18.02.2008: Ben replies that he'll deal with it in the next week or so
* 27.02.2008: Requested update
* 27.02.2008: Patch for Apache 1.3.41 is ready, but release is normally
               managed by Adam Laurie, who is on holiday till March, 11th
* 28.02.2008: Agreed to wait for Adam to return
* 12.03.2008: Ben informs Adam of the new release
* 25.03.2008: Requested update
* 25.03.2008: Ben replies, they are waiting for an updated advisory from me
* 25.03.2008: Sent out updated advisory
* 27.03.2008: Adam says sorry for the delays and that he will try to work
               on this while he is at "a conference in Amsterdam"
* 01.04.2008: Coordination with Adam and Ben on a release

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Solution:

Upgrade to apache_1.3.41+ssl_1.59.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Credits:

- Alexander Klink, Cynops GmbH (discovery)


cheers,
Adam
-- 
Adam Laurie                         Tel: +44 (0) 1304 814800
The Bunker Secure Hosting Ltd.      Fax: +44 (0) 1304 814899
Ash Radar Station
Marshborough Road
Sandwich                            mailto:adam@...roup.co.uk
Kent
CT13 0PL
UNITED KINGDOM                      PGP key on keyservers

Powered by blists - more mailing lists