bugtraq - RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2008 17:31:15 +0100
From: "Dave Korn" <dave.korn@...imi.com>
To: "'Eric Rescorla'" <ekr@...workresonance.com>,
	"'Ben Laurie'" <benl@...gle.com>
Cc: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, <security@...nid.net>,
	"'OpenID List'" <general@...nid.net>, <cryptography@...zdowd.com>,
	<full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

Eric Rescorla wrote on 08 August 2008 16:06:

> At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100,
> Ben Laurie wrote:
>> However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this
>> means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of
>> the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user
>> behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the attack.
>> 
>> Therefore mitigation falls to other parties.
>> 
>> 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default.
> 
> Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client
> side?

  Isn't that exactly what "Browsers must check CRLs" means in this context
anyway?  What alternative client-side blacklisting mechanism do you suggest?

    cheers,
      DaveK
-- 
Can't think of a witty .sigline today....