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Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2008 13:47:01 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@....com>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@...rmont.com>
Cc: Ben Laurie <benl@...gle.com>,
Eric Rescorla <ekr@...workresonance.com>,
Dave Korn <dave.korn@...imi.com>, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
security@...nid.net, OpenID List <general@...nid.net>,
cryptography@...zdowd.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory
On Fri, Aug 08, 2008 at 02:08:37PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> The kerberos style of having credentials expire very quickly is one
> (somewhat less imperfect) way to deal with such things, but it is far
> from perfect and it could not be done for the ad-hoc certificate
> system https: depends on -- the infrastructure for refreshing all the
> world's certs every eight hours doesn't exist, and if it did imagine
> the chaos if it failed for a major CA one fine morning.
The PKIX moral equivalent of Kerberos V tickets would be OCSP Responses.
I understand most current browsers support OCSP.
> One also worries about what will happen in the UI when a certificate
> has been revoked. If it just says "this cert has been revoked,
> continue anyway?" the wrong thing will almost always happen.
No doubt.
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