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Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 11:01:53 +0530
From: "Sandeep Cheema" <51l3n7@...e.in>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: SEPKILL /im SMC.EXE /f

Privilege Escalation attack

POC:

::Save the following as a batch file and execute it.
:here
taskkill /im smcgui.exe /f
 goto :here

Now since the smcgui.exe is running in the user account, It will not be 
denied access to.
When the batch file is running, Open the file "c:\Program 
Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\symcorpui.exe"
Even if the password has been set or the administrator has disabled the user 
to open the GUI, All the conditions will be bypassed.
And as I said before, The Help and Support > Troubleshooting will show the 
server as offline for the client and the NTP will not be visible if its 
installed.

Thank you.

Regads, Sandeep




--------------------------------------------------
From: "Sandeep Cheema" <51l3n7@...e.in>
Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2009 12:50 PM
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: SEPKILL /im SMC.EXE /f

> Please note the following. I have reported this to Symantec at
> https://forums.symantec.com/syment/board/message?board.id=endpoint_protection11&thread.id=25786&view=by_date_ascending&page=2
>
>
>
>
> Symantec,
>
>
>
> I have reported the second part of this to bugtraq, The first part I will 
> in some time, Once I am done with this thread. The part before that is 
> what this thread looks to be about.
>
>
>
> 1)
>
>
>
> POC:
>
>
>
> ::Save the following as a batch file and execute it.
>
> :here
>
> taskkill /im smcgui.exe /f
>
> goto :here
>
>
>
> Its mainly bruteforcing the icon not to appear in the taskbar but doing 
> more than that. The communication with the manager is lost(Though with 
> smc.exe running under system account) and NTP is over and out from the SEP 
> client console while this is running.
>
>
>
> POC:
>
>
>
> With the batch file running, Open the following executable which is the 
> GUI(Not Icon) for SEP
>
> "c:\Program Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\symcorpui.exe"
>
>
>
> If you have NTP installed, It would not be there and if you only have the 
> NTP installed, It will say "No Problems detected- No protection technology 
> is installed" and nothing in that board. If you go to help and support > 
> Troubleshooting. The server is offline for the client.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> All this might be purely cosmetic but guess there's time to get that 
> patched up before mp2 rolls out.
>
>
>
>
>
> 2)
>
>
>
> When the following command line is executed
>
>
>
> "c:\program files\symantec\symantec endpoint protection\smcgui.exe" ~
>
>
>
> The error is thrown as below which lasts for a split second.
>
>
>
> "Serious problem reading transaction from pipe - probable loss of 
> synchonisation a and GetlastError return 6"
>
>
>
> http://www.postimage.org/image.php?v=aV2in8dJ
>
>
>
> and if executed in a batch file in the following way.
>
>
>
> POC:
>
>
>
> ::Save the following as a batch file and execute it.
>
> :here
>
> "c:\program files\symantec\symantec endpoint protection\smcgui.exe" ~
>
> goto :here
>
>
>
>
>
> and run the filemon with the filter as smc.exe, Whenever it tries to 
> access the smcgui.exe. There is a "Buffer Overflow" detected. As I have 
> said at bugtrax as well, I am not sure if the buffer overflow has happened 
> or averted but its all very interesting.
>
>
>
>
>
> Regards, Sandeep Cheema
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Message Edited by S1l3nc3 pl3as3 on 02-18-2009 11:09 PM
> Message Edited by S1l3nc3 pl3as3 on 02-18-2009 11:15 PM
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Sandeep Cheema" <51l3n7@...e.in>
> Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2009 1:54 PM
> To: "Sandeep Cheema" <51l3n7@...e.in>; "Jon Kloske" <jon@...edu.au>
> Cc: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
> Subject: Re: SEPKILL /im SMC.EXE /f
>
>> In fact looks like Symantec has inherited the bug from Sygate. The 
>> original one looks to be patched up though but on similar lines.
>>
>> http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2005/Dec/0249.html
>>
>> Thank you.
>>
>> Regards, Sandeep
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------
>> From: "Sandeep Cheema" <51l3n7@...e.in>
>> Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2009 1:48 PM
>> To: "Jon Kloske" <jon@...edu.au>
>> Cc: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
>> Subject: Re: SEPKILL /im SMC.EXE /f
>>
>>> Hi Jon,
>>>
>>> Probably there has been some confusion.
>>>
>>> The smc.exe -p ~ was a different thread and drwtsn32 was a different one
>>> with different subject lines.
>>>
>>> Anyway. This is what my new findings are in continuation with the tilde.
>>>
>>> On executing the following command line
>>> "%programfiles%\symantec\symantec endpoint protection\smcgui.exe" ~
>>> The attached error is thrown by the SMGUI.exe which lasts for a split
>>> second.
>>>
>>> "Serious problem reading transaction from pipe - probable loss of
>>> synchonisation a and GetlastError return 6"
>>>
>>>
>>> When the following batch file is run
>>>
>>> :here
>>> "%programfiles%\symantec\symantec endpoint protection\smcgui.exe" ~
>>> goto :here
>>>
>>> and the filemon is run along with it with the filter as smcgui.exe, 
>>> Whenever
>>> the smc.exe tries to access smcgui.exe there is a "Buffer Overflow", I 
>>> am
>>> not sure if the buffer overflow actually has happened or it has been
>>> avoided.
>>>
>>> The recordings are from limited user and admin account and have the same
>>> result.
>>>
>>> Also. Worth noting is that once the command is executed then the same
>>> behavior(error) is noted with any parameter passed to smcgui.exe
>>>
>>> For example :  "%programfiles%\symantec\symantec endpoint
>>> protection\smcgui.exe" test
>>> The same is the case with smc.exe when used with -p
>>>
>>> Which indicates that the buffer overflow has happened but I am not 
>>> entirely
>>> sure about it.
>>>
>>> Thank you.
>>>
>>> Regards, Sandeep
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Jon Kloske" <jon@...edu.au>
>>> Sent: Monday, February 16, 2009 6:53 AM
>>> To: "David Calabro" <dcalabro@...nsitionalwork.org>; "Sandeep Cheema"
>>> <51l3n7@...e.in>
>>> Cc: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
>>> Subject: RE: SEPKILL /im SMC.EXE /f
>>>
>>>> Hi David and Sandeep,
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps I'm missing something, but everything you're saying I either
>>>> can't reproduce on my test systems or requires administrator privileges
>>>> anyway, at which point crashing smc is the least of your problems.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> If the Symantec Management Client service was somehow changed from
>>>>> "smc.exe" to "smc.exe -P" it would effectively prevent the service
>>>> from
>>>>> starting in the first place. Correct?
>>>>
>>>> What are you trying to target with this?
>>>>
>>>> If you can change that portion of the registry, why not replace smc.exe
>>>> with "del c:\*.* /q /s /f" or "maliciousprogram.exe" or whatever?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> >>> You can kill smc.exe with the help of drwtsn32.exe in the
>>>> following
>>>>> way.
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>> drwtsn32 -p %pid%
>>>>> >>> where pid is the process id for smc.exe
>>>>
>>>> There's nothing remarkable about this at all. If you tell Dr Watson to
>>>> debug any process id, it's going to end the process. Or at least it did
>>>> to half a dozen applications I tested it on :)
>>>>
>>>> Then again, you need administrator privs for this, so really, the same
>>>> argument here applies as above. If you have this level of access, why
>>>> not just use your administrator privileges more directly instead of
>>>> trying to find some pointlessly circumspect method.
>>>>
>>>> I'm not saying you aren't on to something - there does appear to be 
>>>> some
>>>> limited amount of instability in the smc.exe binary possibly to do with
>>>> paramter validation or parsing or something - but I just can't see at
>>>> this stage how it's useful, given that I've been unable to get any of
>>>> these problems to affect the actual antivirus process running in the
>>>> system account (that's the one that does the actual work), without
>>>> administrator privileges (and then as indicated, it's not much of an
>>>> exploit if it requires administrative privileges to pull off.)
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Jon.
>>>>
> 

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