lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2010 11:34:41 -0500
From: "Francis, Shannon" <Shannon.Francis@...blue.com>
To: "Dan Dascalescu" <ddascalescu@...il.com>,
	<bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: RE: Major security risk in the unlock pattern for Android devices

But you'd have no idea where to start or end the tracing. This, in
effect, gives unlimited possible combinations based on differing
starting and ending points of the same pattern.

Shannon Francis
IT Security Compliance Analyst
JetBlue Airways
8265 Hanger Blvd
Orlando, FL 32827
Tel: 407.375.0405

-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Dascalescu [mailto:ddascalescu@...il.com] 
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 8:17 PM
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Major security risk in the unlock pattern for Android devices

If you use locking, just look carefully at your Android phone screen
and you'll most likely already see the streak/smudge fingerprint
trace. An attacker only has to trace that in both directions and is
guaranteed access. By contrast, smudges left behind a PIN of N digits
offer N! combinations.

This is a common scenario that leaves the smudge easily visible:
1. Receive a notification of some sort (IM, SMS, e-mail etc.)
2. Unlock the phone (leaves the fingerprint trace)
3. Delete the notification (one or two taps that don't erase or
scatter the smudge).
4. Lock the phone (usually pressing a hardware button, leaving the
smudge intact).

Issue filed at http://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=3146#c4

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux - Powered by OpenVZ