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Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2012 11:31:10 GMT
From: ali.raheem@...il.com
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Multiple SQL injections in rivettracker <=1.03

# Exploit Title: Multiple SQL injections in rivettracker <=1.03
# Date: 2/3/2012
# Author: Ali Raheem
# Software Link: http://www.rivetcode.com/software/rivettracker/
# Version: <=1.03
# Tested on: Linux guruplug-debian 3.1.7 #2 PREEMPT Tue Jan 3 20:19:54
MST 2012 armv5tel GNU/Linux
# Greets: spyware, dividead

RivetTracker is a php base torrent tracker. Though rivettracker is
largely designed for a trusted user environment it does have 3 levels
of access. Admin (add&delete torrents), uploader and unauthenticated
(if $hiddentracker == false). However, vulnerable files such as
torrent_functions.php can always be accessed by anyone since there is
no $hiddentracker check (epic fail).
Despite this high level of access few inputs are sanities and lines like this:
$query = "SELECT filename FROM ".$prefix."namemap WHERE info_hash = '". $_GET['hash'] . "'";

Found in dltorrent.php (which can be accessed by any one if
hiddentracker is false) is unforgivable.

The only check performed is to insure $_GET['hash'] is 40 chars long.
We can defeat this simply with padding with 0's if poison null bytes
are not patched we can force the SQL query to return the filename of a
file we want to view and download it.

path_to_rivettracker/dltorrent.php?hash=00000' UNION ALL SELECT '../config.php\0
With the PNB patch on php version >=5.3.4 (and backports) we still
have arbitary SQL queries but no config.php. config.php contains
passwords and usernames for admin, user and mysql database.

Other files have unsanitised inputs such as torrent_functions.php,
here we have no checks! Further more $hiddentracker isn't even
checked! And anyone has access to this file and can run SQL commands
via post.

Here's my testbench for torrent_functions.php
ali@...-PC:~$ cat test.htm<form
action="http://127.0.0.1/rivettracker/torrent_functions.php"
method="POST"> <input
type="test" name="hash" size="100"/> <input
type="submit"/></form>
Depending on the privs of the database user you can raise all kinds of
hell (shell creation and arbitrary code execution.)

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