bugtraq - Hard-coded accounts on multiple network cameras

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Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 08:22:47 GMT
From: roberto.paleari@...ze.net
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Hard-coded accounts on multiple network cameras

Hard-coded accounts on multiple network cameras
===============================================

[ADVISORY INFORMATION]
Title:		Hard-coded accounts on multiple network cameras
Discovery date: 05/06/2013
Release date:   11/07/2013
Advisory URL:   http://goo.gl/82Rlb
Credits: 	Roberto Paleari (roberto.paleari@...ze.net, @rpaleari)
		Alessandro Di Pinto (alessandro.dipinto@...ze.net, @adipinto)

[VULNERABILITY INFORMATION]
Class: 	        Authentication bypass, command execution

[AFFECTED PRODUCTS]
We confirm the presence of the security vulnerability on the following
products/firmware versions:
   * 3S Vision N1072 network camera, firmware version v1.07_STD-1
   * 3S Vision N1073 network camera, firmware version v1.02_STD-1
   * 3S Vision N3071 network camera, firmware version v1.05_STD-1
   * Asante Voyager 1 network camera, firmware version v2.08
   * Asante Voyager 2 network camera, firmware version v2.08
   * ALinking ALC-9451/ALC-9452 network cameras, firmware version v1.33

Several other device manufacturers, models and firmware versions are probably
also vulnerable, but they were not checked, mainly due to time constraints.

[VULNERABILITY DETAILS] 
The web server and RTSP daemon of the affected cameras include an hard-coded
user account. Different device manufacturers (and camera models) use different
hard-coded accounts. This issue can be abused by remote attackers to gain
administrative access to the affected devices.

In the following, we report the hard-coded accounts for 3S Vision and Asante
network cameras, as these are the only device manufacturers that were contacted
and replies to our inquiries.

- 3S Vision cameras
  * HTTP & RTSP account: "3sadmin:27988303"

- Asante Voyager 1 network cameras
  * HTTP account: "uniform:uic7799"
  * RTSP account: "uicrd:xu06m3"

- Asante Voyager 2 network cameras
  * HTTP & RTSP account: "uicrd:xu06m3"

As the account is hard-coded in the web server and RTSP server binary files, it
cannot be changed by end-users without upgrading the whole firmware image (or
manually patching the executable files).

[REMEDIATION] 
Asante provided Emaze with a patched firmware image that disables the
hard-coded account. At the time of writing, this software version is still not
available through the company's web site, but will probably be released very
soon. To the best of our knowledge, other device manufacturers have not
addressed the issues described in this advisory, thus no updated firmware
versions are available for their products.

[COPYRIGHT]
Copyright(c) Emaze Networks S.p.A 2013, All rights reserved worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no
changes are made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers remain intact.

[DISCLAIMER]
Emaze Networks S.p.A is not responsible for the misuse of the information
provided in our security advisories. These advisories are a service to the
professional security community. There are NO WARRANTIES with regard to this
information. Any application or distribution of this information constitutes
acceptance AS IS, at the user's own risk. This information is subject to change
without notice.