bugtraq - Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure

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Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 00:30:25 +0200
From: Reindl Harald <h.reindl@...lounge.net>
To: Stefan Kanthak <stefan.kanthak@...go.de>
CC: Tobias Kreidl <tobias.kreidl@....edu>, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information
 disclosure



Am 11.08.2013 23:56, schrieb Stefan Kanthak:
> "Reindl Harald" <h.reindl@...lounge.net> wrote:
>> again:
>> symlinks are to not poision always and everywhere
>> they become where untrusted customer code is running
>> blame the admin which doe snot know his job and not
>> the language offering a lot of functions where some
>> can be misused
> 
> Again: symlinks are well-known as attack vector for years!

and that's why any admin which is not clueless
disables the symlink function - but there exists
code which *is* secure, runs in a crontrolled
environment and make use of it for good reasons

> It's not the user/administrator who develops or ships insecure code!

but it's the administrator which has the wrong job if
create symlinks is possible from any random script
running on his servers

anyways, i am done with this thread

the topic is *not* "Apache suEXEC privilege elevation" it
is "admins not secure their servers" - period



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