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Date: Mon, 01 Sep 2014 23:32:13 +0200 From: john <mail@...nbond.org> To: Stephanie Daugherty <sdaugherty@...il.com>, John Leo <johnleo@...ckssh.com> CC: fulldisclosure@...lists.org, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Re: [FD] SSH host key fingerprint - through HTTPS On 01/09/14 10:43, Stephanie Daugherty wrote: > Sure it shows me the fingerprint, but it doesn't tell me for sure if that's > the RIGHT fingerprint or the fingerprint of an imposter, > > It's entirely possible that both myself and that site are BOTH falling > victim to a MITM attack.(routing attacks, DNS attacks, etc) > > Proper host key verification (which nobody does) ideally means one or more > of: > * Verification that the SSH host key is connected via certificate chain to > a trusted certificate, > * Comparison to a fingerprint being posted on the organization's OWN https > site > * Comparison to a fingerprint provided with a GPG or S/MIME signature from > the administrator of the machine. > * Voice verification of the host public key or its fingerprint with the > administrator of the machine. > * Obtaining a printed copy of the host public key or its fingerprint > directly from the administrator. Or just use an SSHFP record in a signed zone
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