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Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 09:55:01 +0200
From: security@...driva.com
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [ MDVSA-2015:207 ] perl-Module-Signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

 _______________________________________________________________________

 Mandriva Linux Security Advisory                         MDVSA-2015:207
 http://www.mandriva.com/en/support/security/
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Package : perl-Module-Signature
 Date    : April 27, 2015
 Affected: Business Server 1.0
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Problem Description:

 Updated perl-Module-Signature package fixes the following security
 vulnerabilities reported by John Lightsey:
 
 Module::Signature could be tricked into interpreting the unsigned
 portion of a SIGNATURE file as the signed portion due to faulty
 parsing of the PGP signature boundaries.
 
 When verifying the contents of a CPAN module, Module::Signature
 ignored some files in the extracted tarball that were not listed in
 the signature file. This included some files in the t/ directory that
 would execute automatically during make test
 
 When generating checksums from the signed manifest, Module::Signature
 used two argument open() calls to read the files. This allowed
 embedding arbitrary shell commands into the SIGNATURE file that would
 execute during the signature verification process.
 
 Several modules were loaded at runtime inside the extracted module
 directory. Modules like Text::Diff are not guaranteed to be available
 on all platforms and could be added to a malicious module so that
 they would load from the &#039;.&#039; path in \@INC.
 _______________________________________________________________________

 References:

 http://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2015-0160.html
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Updated Packages:

 Mandriva Business Server 1/X86_64:
 47149b012bb749c0bad31476a85d7d37  mbs1/x86_64/perl-Module-Signature-0.730.0-1.1.mbs1.noarch.rpm 
 e10863123658798234fc8304bda196b5  mbs1/SRPMS/perl-Module-Signature-0.730.0-1.1.mbs1.src.rpm
 _______________________________________________________________________

 To upgrade automatically use MandrivaUpdate or urpmi.  The verification
 of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you.

 All packages are signed by Mandriva for security.  You can obtain the
 GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing:

  gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98

 You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at:

  http://www.mandriva.com/en/support/security/advisories/

 If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact

  security_(at)_mandriva.com
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Type Bits/KeyID     Date       User ID
 pub  1024D/22458A98 2000-07-10 Mandriva Security Team
  <security*mandriva.com>
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