From: recon at snosoft.com (Strategic Reconnaissance Team)
Subject: [Secure Network Operations, Inc.]
	FullDisclosure != Exploit Release

Well, 
	You also need to consider that this is causing extra stress for the
vendors.  We are in fact forcing them to kick out of their normal
schedule, and work overtime to fix problems.  If we all did this, they
would be overly swamped and probably go under, or so I'd think.  Before
we started SNOsoft I worked for a software company. I left because there
was no security design or testing involved in the development process.
Whenever someone released an advisory, the entire team would go nuts
trying to fix it. Granted, security should have been a part of the
product, but we do need to keep in mind that its not. The question is,
how do we make it a part of the process. How do we educate the people
that need to be educated (CEO's CTO's Managers). We can't do that at the
low level. Anyway, my two cents is getting too long..   thats my ten
cents. 



On Wed, 2003-01-29 at 14:59, Giri, Sandeep wrote:
> Hi!
> >From a security professional's point of view, releasing an exploit is
> beneficial.
> If he releases exploit someone would certainly write a virus for the same.
> Which will make companies realise the benefit in hiring the security
> professionals.
> 
> So, from my point of view, writing viruses which doesn't physically destroy
> any thing is also okay;)
> 
> Sorry, if it hurts the ethics..and if it sends wrong singnals about my area
> of work.
> 
> Thanks.
> Regards,
> Sandeep Giri
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: hellNbak [mailto:hellnbak@...c.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2003 11:16 PM
> To: Ron DuFresne
> Cc: Strategic Reconnaissance Team; Nicolas Villatte;
> full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> Subject: Re: RE : RE : [Full-Disclosure] [Secure Network Operations,
> Inc.] FullDisclosure != Exploit Release
> 
> 
> Thanks for adding zero value Ron.
> 
> We are not talking about working with vendors or notifying vendors.  I
> made the assumption that the Snosoft guys have their own policy on what to
> do with vendors.  We have our own at NMRC and we are quite willing to work
> with a vendor.  But that is not what we are discussing here.
> 
> On Wed, 29 Jan 2003, Ron DuFresne wrote:
> 
> > Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 08:35:39 -0600 (CST)
> > From: Ron DuFresne <dufresne@...ternet.com>
> > To: hellNbak <hellnbak@...c.org>
> > Cc: Strategic Reconnaissance Team <recon@...soft.com>,
> >      Nicolas Villatte <Nicolas.Villatte@...alvas.be>,
> >      full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> > Subject: Re: RE : RE : [Full-Disclosure] [Secure Network Operations,
> >      Inc.] FullDisclosure != Exploit Release
> >
> > On Tue, 28 Jan 2003, hellNbak wrote:
> >
> >
> > 	[SNIP]
> >
> > >
> > > So I say release the code, try and make it as crippled as possible
> > > (localhost only or whatever) so at least you know that *your* code won't
> > > be directly used for malicious intent.  Yeah exploits and malicious
> > > code/worms/virus'/whatever will still exist and be abused but regardless
> > > of what you and anyone else for that matter do it always will.
> > >
> > > At least with releasing code you can take comfort in knowing that you
> are
> > > helping those who cannot help themselves.  That is of course if you
> > > believe in helping others and don't just release advisories for the
> > > media-whoring marketing purposes (hello to my friends at ISS ;p).
> > >
> > >
> >
> > What's interesting about the disclosure debates in their various forms, is
> > that it has been ongoing since the first earliest security lists, <check
> > the http://securitydigest.org/ site>.  In fact, the debate seemed to be at
> > time a near show stopper for a number of the early lists, at times they
> > never got much beyond the topic, for long periods of time, and some lists
> > died or went stagemant while enthralled within the discussion process>.
> > And, to this day it persists.  Though the trend has been softened with the
> > term "responsible" prepended.  In that light, rather then issueing a quick
> > advisory with a borked exploit enclosed, it might be better to issue the
> > warning, after first letting the vendor<s> in question know of your
> > findings and giving them at least a modicum of time to ingest your work,
> > then later down the road, posting the code you developed.  Perhaps
> > allowing a large portion of those exposed, to fix their sites and be
> > prepared for the coming mess of adverse packets?
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> >
> > Ron DuFresne
> > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > "Cutting the space budget really restores my faith in humanity.  It
> > eliminates dreams, goals, and ideals and lets us get straight to the
> > business of hate, debauchery, and self-annihilation." -- Johnny Hart
> > 	***testing, only testing, and damn good at it too!***
> >
> > OK, so you're a Ph.D.  Just don't touch anything.
> >
> >
-- 
Strategic Reconnaissance Team <recon@...soft.com>
Secure Network Operations, Inc.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 232 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20030129/bb887fc1/attachment.bin

Powered by blists - more mailing lists