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From: mej at eterm.org (Michael Jennings)
Subject: Re: Terminal Emulator Security Issues

(vulnwatch -> vulndiscuss at the request of the moderator)

On Tuesday, 25 February 2003, at 08:07:08 (-0600),
H D Moore wrote:

> Would stripping escape sequences from the window title work? Do you
> know of any applications that actually use this feature?

Well, my gut reaction was a patch which removed all characters less
than 32 from the title and icon name when setting them, and when
fetching them for display changed all such characters to blanks.  That
would effectively disable any carriage returns/linefeeds, escape
codes, shift-in/shift-out, etc.  (Incidentally, I was unable to embed
any such sequences in the title/icon name in 0.9.2 anyway...but I
didn't try for very long, so I may have missed something.)

While that would certainly disable the ability for the commands to be
hidden from the user the way you mentioned (which actually tends to be
ineffective on Eterm anyway, since most people don't use solid colored
backgrounds...but I digress :) ), as your sample showed, it is still
possible to throw a sequence of commands up onto the terminal,
requiring only the press of an Enter key on the part of the user.

And as UNIX (esp. Linux) gains mainstream acceptance, more novices
will be using it.  Since the UNIX command line is indistinguishable
from line noise by the typical novice, it's not a far leap to think
that one of them might pay attention to the "Press Enter" part (likely
the only part which would make sense to them), not realizing the
affect the command might have.  Especially if it didn't produce any
output.

So I guess it boils down to a question of, where does "social
engineering" end and "user ignorance/stupidity" begin?  I think some
discussion on that topic would be beneficial, at least for developers
like me who would always rather do a feature right than not do it at
all.

And no, I'm not aware of any application which uses that feature,
but with the recent batch of "shell prompt theming" applications
(bashish, and the like), I wouldn't be at all surprised if there was
one.

> Absolutely correct, this paper was written over a period of months,
> the 0.9.1 release was the latest version available with most
> distributions when I made that claim. The reasons for picking on
> Eterm:
> 
> * arbitrary command execution at one point in its lifetime

Yup.  Major brain fart there.  It was always intended solely as an
interim measure, but I failed to fully consider its implications.

> * arbitrary file creation with user-defined content (via clear screen)
> * shared feature-sets with xterm, rxvt, etc
> * great documentation for all of these features ;)

If only users were as thorough in their perusal of the documentation
as you were....  :-)

> The vendor coordination was done through the vendor-sec mailing list
> with about a three-week head start prior to disclosure. There really
> weren't many true "bugs" found, just about everything covered was
> implemented deliberately and could be found in the documentation of
> the app. There had already been a number of debates on the
> exploitability of these features, so this paper was more of a FAQ
> than any sort of advisory.  It wasn't my intention to catch anyone
> off-guard on this, just to bring these issues back into the
> limelight for a while and see if other people had a similar take on
> them.

Understood.  As I mentioned, the only thing you mentioned that I
didn't know of (and the only thing to which 0.9.2 is vulnerable) was
the title setting issue, which I would just like to say was an
absolutely *brilliant* piece of work.  Never would I have thought to
combine such a seemingly innocuous feature with a creative bit of
social engineering to such a potentially devastating effect.

Truly impressive, as was the report overall.  Kudos. :)

Michael

-- 
Michael Jennings (a.k.a. KainX)  http://www.kainx.org/  <mej@...nx.org>
n + 1, Inc., http://www.nplus1.net/       Author, Eterm (www.eterm.org)
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