full-disclosure - PGP vs. certificate from Verisign

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From: yossarian at planet.nl (yossarian)
Subject: PGP vs. certificate from Verisign

From: "Jason" <security@...enik.com>
To: "Steve Poirot" <poirotsj@....net>
Cc: <full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
Sent: Saturday, May 10, 2003 10:15 PM
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] PGP vs. certificate from Verisign

>
>
> Steve Poirot wrote:
> > I'm 98% sure that the key pair is generated on the client machine and
> > that just the public key is transmitted to the CA.  The reason I say 98%
> > instead of 100% is that it's possible that a CA just makes it look like
> > that's what's happening.  This could be verified by sniffing the
session.
> > Steve Poirot
> >
Jason wrote:
> In the case of an implementation faulire you would
> have to verify this... which is what you should _always_ do with
> _proper_ certificates since they can be legally binding. I know this to
> be the case in the US and Europe at least.

Which is another reason to stay far away from verisign certificates - the
legal issues surrounding it. If you lose your PGP private key - who cares -
just like with your passport: get a new one, pay a fine, duh. But if your
verisign private key gets nicked and you do not notice it - you have lost
your digital identity - but be legally responsible for whatever someone else
chooses to do with it - the non-repudiation fraud.  And like I said in
another posting in this discussion recently, even if you do notice it - and
what not too paranoid user would? - how to disable it by lack of CDP's?

Just for those interested - read the Verisign CPS and compare it to any
banks regulation for credit cards or bankcards - then make a risk analysis:
what are the benefits of having a digital identity and what are the risks to
your person - in the US and Europe at least. Then bring in how likely and
feasible identity theft is into the equation, now and in the near future.
Will you let your identity and all that comes with it depend on a number of
bytes on your hard disk, a smartcard or whatever, just so you can buy
'content' online? Or to be able to e-mail 'secure' with someone you have
never met? For all the other things you can do with a digital signature all
you get is convenience - e-government, buying houses online, whatever - all
you might gain is a way of doing it from your computer.

It never stops to amaze me how many 'true believers in PKI' still exist. The
hype is over. It does not work. If you think you need asymmetric encryption
for your email: use a PGP flavor.