lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  john-users  owl-users  popa3d-users  /  xvendor  oss-security  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
This website is powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux security-enhanced OS
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [month] [year] [list] 
From: frank at knobbe.us (Frank Knobbe)
Subject: Presidential Candidates' Websites Vulnerable

On Thu, 2004-07-01 at 10:48, Jordan Klein wrote:
> Oh yes, and there should be a checksum of the unique number assigned to each
> vote to ensure that someone couldn't just reverse engineer the barcode and
> make up a bunch of bogus votes.  I'm not sure exactly how that part would
> work, but I'm sure there's a way.

There needs to be mechanism to block "a bunch of made-up votes". Someone
could also make up fake punch-cards. Same issue, same solution.

More important is the issue of *disappearing* votes. Voter gets a
receipt, yes, but how can you guarantee that her vote (bar code or
otherwise) has actually been counted? 

Regards,
Frank

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 187 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20040701/fe5249b3/attachment.bin

Hosted by DataForce ISP - Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux