full-disclosure - Security hole in Confixx backup script

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From: dirk at pirschel.de (Dirk Pirschel)
Subject: Security hole in Confixx backup script

Hi,

* Dirk Pirschel wrote on Mon, 02 Aug 2004 at 13:00 +0200:

> A user might use the restore funktion to change the ownership of
> target files to his own.

The restore script runs with root privileges.  It unpacks the archive,
and then executes "chown -R $user" in the destination directory
($HOME/html or $HOME/files).  Before running the restore script, an
attacker can make hardlinks to files not owned by himself.  The
ownership of these files will be changed.

On some badly administered systems there is only one disk partion, so it
is possible to make a hardlink to /etc/shdadow within $HOME.

-Dirk

-- 
Linux - Life is too short for reboots
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