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From: idlabs-advisories at idefense.com (idlabs-advisories@...fense.com)
Subject: iDEFENSE Security Advisory 09.02.04b: Oracle Database Server
 ctxsys.driload Access Validation Vulnerability

Oracle Database Server ctxsys.driload Access Validation Vulnerability

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 09.02.04b
www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=136&type=vulnerabilities
September 2, 2004

I. BACKGROUND

Oracle Database Server is a family of database products that range from
personal databases to enterprise solutions. Further information is
available at:

http://www.oracle.com/database/index.html

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of an access validation vulnerability in multiple
versions of Oracle Corp.'s Oracle Database Server could allow
authenticated users to obtain administrative privileges.

The problem specifically exists because although Oracle 9i Databases
have the account ctxsys locked by default, ctxsys.driload is still
accessible by users. The package ctxsys.driload allows every user to
execute commands as DBA. A database connection with execute permissions
on the package ctxsys.driload is required. The following example query
executed under the credentials of the default user scott (password
'tiger') demonstrates this vulnerability:

SQL> exec ctxsys.driload.validate_stmt
       ('create user hacker identified by hacker');
SQL> exec ctxsys.driload.validate_stmt('grant dba, connect to hacker');

III. ANALYSIS

Successful exploitation allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary
commands as DBA, which allows complete control over the database.This
vulnerability is the result of three separate issues:

1. Some packages of ctxsys are granted to public (e.g. driload)

2. The package driload uses the permissions of the owner (CTXSYS = DBA)
instead of the caller of the procedure (e.g. scott).

3. The package driload executes every valid SQL command (e.g. create
user, grant dba to, drop user, etc.) without further tests.

Locking of the ctxsys user account does not prevent exploitation.

IV. DETECTION

DEFENSE has confirmed that Oracle Database Server version 9.2.0.4 is
vulnerable. It has been reported that 8.1.7.4, and 9.0.1.3 are
vulnerable. It is suspected that all versions earlier than 9.2.0.4 are
vulnerable.

V. WORKAROUND

If ctxsys is not needed, drop the user by executing the following SQL
statement:

SQL> Drop user ctxsys

Otherwise, revoke public privileges to the vulnerable object via the
following SQL statement:

SQL> revoke grant ctxsys.driload from public

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

"[This] issue [has] been addressed in Alert 68."

http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security/pdf/2004alert68.pdf

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CAN-2004-0637 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

05/06/2004   Initial vendor notification
05/06/2004   iDEFENSE clients notified
05/06/2004   Initial vendor response
09/02/2004   Public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

Alexander Kornbrust (www.red-database-security.com) is credited with
this discovery.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright (c) 2004 iDEFENSE, Inc.
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDEFENSE. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please
email customerservice@...fense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.


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