lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
From: jcreegan at questarweb.com (John Creegan)
Subject: Will a vote for John Kerry be counted by
	a HartInterCivic eSlate3000 in Honolu

I'll bet because Jason is testing the "notification if system failed" portion of the  process.  And the way he wrote it, like he intended go on public record in a way that *might* be useable in a public action later.  Though if I may make an assumption...I'd agree with Bart here, Jason, it's risky.

>>> <Bart.Lansing@...ls.com> 10/21/04 09:29AM >>>

Jason, I have a rather direct question:  Given what you know...and what 
you wrote....why in blazes did you cast your vote electronically?

Bart Lansing
Manager, Desktop Services/Lotus Notes
Kohl's IT


full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com wrote on 10/20/2004 08:24:59 PM:

> I just voted for John Kerry at a walk-in absentee ballot polling 
> place in Honolulu County using an eSlate3000 (unit serial number 
> A05A0B) made by Hart Intercivic: http://www.hartintercivic.com 
> 
> I was told by the official who gave me the choice of voting on paper
> or voting electronically that the electronic voting machines weren't
> supposed to be here yet, but that since they arrived in time for the
> 2004 election, they were being used anyway.
> 
> Will my vote be counted? That depends on a number of unknowns, such 
> as whether or not the unit on which my vote was cast subsequently 
> malfunctions, rendering the entire vote tabulating memory card corrupt.
> 
> I did not receive a paper printout following the submission of my 
> electronic ballot.
> 
> Excluding the obvious possibility that fraud may occur, either to 
> stuff the electronic 'ballot box' with false votes, or to 
> intentionally destroy or fail to count votes for a particular 
> candidate, there are risks inherent to electronic voting that do not
> exist in the same way with paper ballots. And although there are 
> technical safeguards possible that seem like common sense, these 
> safeguards continue to be ignored. Why?
> 
> Will we ever see common sense safeguards added to the electronic 
> voting process?
> 
> A search for known security vulnerabilities or potential flaws in 
> voting equipment manufactured and sold by Hart InterCivic turns up:
> 
> http://www.conspiracyplanet.com/channel.cfm?channelid=31&contentid=1570 
> 
> Prior to casting my vote, I provided a written 'application' to vote
> containing my current address and other contact information. 
> Election officials have every bit of information necessary to inform
> me in the event of a memory card failure or other malfunction that 
> causes my electronic vote not to be counted properly.
> 
> We know the very equipment that I just used to cast my vote has 
> malfunctioned in the past. There have never been any reports that 
> any voter has ever been allowed to revote following the loss of 
> their electronic vote database record. Why not?
> 
> I find it absurd that common sense solutions to electronic voting 
> problems are not being used. The vote I just cast could be made 
> available for my anonymous review after it has been counted. For 
> that matter, all votes made by all voters could be aggregated and 
> published such that any voter could confirm that the vote that was 
> counted was in fact the vote that they cast.
> 
> Such a safeguard would ensure that no fraud could occur without 
> timely detection by those voters who are directly affected, and no 
> vote would go uncounted or be miscounted by mistake unless voters 
> choose not to perform such data validation.
> 
> If we're going to allow these electronic voting devices in our 
> elections, then we the people must be empowered to become the all 
> volunteer quality assurance army that validates the data output.
> 
> Reasonable people can live with the necessity to trust election 
> officials to be honest, and the criminal justice procedures to hold 
> them accountable when they are not, but who are we supposed to hold 
> accountable when equipment failures and flawed computer disaster 
> recovery planning result in the secret exclusion of members of the 
> public from access to their right to vote?
> 
> If anyone has any further information about Hart InterCivic and the 
> eSlate3000, please contact me directly.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Jason Coombs
> jasonc@...ence.org 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html 


CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: 
This is a transmission from Kohl's Department Stores, Inc.
and may contain information which is confidential and proprietary.
If you are not the addressee, any disclosure, copying or distribution or use of the contents of this message is expressly prohibited.
If you have received this transmission in error, please destroy it and notify us immediately at 262-703-7000.

CAUTION:
Internet and e-mail communications are Kohl's property and Kohl's reserves the right to retrieve and read any message created, sent and received.  Kohl's reserves the right to monitor messages by authorized Kohl's Associates at any time
without any further consent.


This message (including any attachments) contains confidential 
information intended for a specific individual and purpose, 
and is protected by law.  If you are not the intended recipient,
you should delete this message and are hereby notified that any 
disclosure,copying, or distribution of this message, or the taking 
of any action based on it, is strictly prohibited.


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ