full-disclosure - Re: crontab from vixie-cron allows read other users crontabs

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Date: Wed Apr  6 23:27:34 2005
From: dwmalone at maths.tcd.ie (David Malone)
Subject: Re: crontab from vixie-cron allows read other
	users crontabs

On Wed, Apr 06, 2005 at 12:00:48PM +0200, Karol Wi?sek wrote:
> Details:
> 
> Insufficient checks allows user to change during edition regular file to
> symbolic link to any file. While copying crontab uses root permisions,
> but also checks entrys, so attacker is only able to read properly
> formated crontab files (another users crontabs).

Is this not the same bug as:

	http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/archive/bugtraq/2000/10/msg00326.html

which was fixed in a number of OSs at the time? For example on
FreeBSD you get an error that crontabs should be edited in place.

	David.

22:23:kac 18% setenv EDITOR /tmp/c
22:23:kac 19% crontab -e
/tmp/crontab.nW9oUGhN18
$ unlink /tmp/crontab.nW9oUGhN18
$ ln -s /var/cron/tabs/root
$ set -E
$ ln -s /var/cron/tabs/root /tmp/crontab.nW9oUGhN18
$ exit
crontab: temp file must be edited in place
22:24:kac 20% uname 
FreeBSD