Date: Thu May 19 14:50:17 2005
From: jonathan at nuclearelephant.com (Jonathan Zdziarski)
Subject: Mac OSX 10.4 Dashboard Authentication Hijacking
	Vulnerability

>
> Except, it won't truly auto-install without user confirmation first.

How many newbie users are going to know what that warning means? It  
doesn't warn that someone could run malicious software by downloading  
and installing this...and the wording even fooled me. I thought I was  
clicking the 'Download' button, but really I was clicking a  
'Download, then Auto-Install' button. Big difference. The  
confirmation is misleading at best. But alas, this is a different bug  
which I still feel is unaddressed.

>   The real issue is the dialog in that sheet should be more along  
> the lines of warning that it'll be "opened" as well... it's not  
> enough of a warning, but it does block against the non-user- 
> intervention issue.

Agreed.

> However, you CAN download it without wanting to auto-install it.   
> Even with the "open safe files" preference checked, a user can  
> option+click the widget download link and it will ONLY download it  
> and not attempt to open it.  At which point, you can double click  
> on the ZIP archive to expand it, and then safely analyze the widget  
> package.  (And, as already established, if "open safe files" isn't  
> checked, then it won't install itself either.)

I don't understand why Safari has to open it at all. It's none of  
Safari's business to execute applications after you download them.  
There's a big difference between unzipping it for you (which I'm cool  
with) and executing it. Although I am an avid Windows-hater, the one  
thing I like about XP SP2 is that it prompts you to download OR open  
the file.

> The sudo issue is a different issue entirely, is a well known  
> issue, and goes beyond widgets.  From a technical standpoint,  
> widgets are no more dangerous than any other application that a  
> user may download.

I have to disagree with you there. The Dashboard has a specific  
interface for allowing javascript applications to execute system  
commands. This opens up a big can of worms. Dashboard widgets also  
run in the background (invisible to the user), unless they are  
viewing their dashboard, and people on average run several. This  
suggests that:

1. Any kid could code up a malicious widget and stick it on a  
website. It takes a lot more to code an application someone would  
want to download and insert malware into it (I realize both are  
fairly trivial, but now you can do it with javascript).
2. People are likely to download and run several widgets without  
checking them out or evaluating their credibility (when was the last  
time you grep'd for sudo in a widget?)
3. People are likely to let a malicious widget run on their system  
24x7 in the background without even knowing it

It's not like an application where, you boot it up and you notice  
there's some "funny" behavior, so you get rid of it. A widget could  
be sitting there, lost in obscurity, not even visible to a user and  
sending all your keychain passwords and other information somewhere.

I think the bigger issue here is that widgets shouldn't have the  
ability to gain administrative control. Javascript is supposed to be  
considered "safe". What concerns me more is that this is integrated  
with Safari, and since you can run widgets in a browser, I am  
starting to wonder if you could execute system commands remotely by  
visiting a website - e.g. instead of injecting the widget, whether  
you could run one or take advantage of the widget interfaces remotely.

Jonathan

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