full-disclosure - SEC Consult SA-20051107-0 :: toendaCMS multiple vulnerabilites

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Date: Mon Nov  7 13:14:40 2005
From: research at sec-consult.com (Bernhard Mueller)
Subject: SEC Consult SA-20051107-0 :: toendaCMS multiple
	vulnerabilites

SEC-CONSULT Security Advisory 20051107-0
=============================================================================
                  title: toendaCMS multiple vulnerabilites
                program: toendaCMS
     vulnerable version: <0.6.2
               homepage: www.toenda.com
                  found: 2005-10-25
                     by: Bernhard Mueller / SEC-CONSULT /
www.sec-consult.com
=============================================================================

Vendor description:
---------------

The toendaCMS Content Management and Weblogging tool gives you a modern,
professional publishing system, based on an SQL and/or XML database.

Vulnerabilty overview:
---------------

toendaCMS contains various security flaws. These include:

  * theft of CMS usernames and passwords (XML database mode)
  * session theft (XML database mode)
  * directory traversal / reading of arbitrary files (XML database mode)
  * arbitrary file uploads

Vulnerability details:
---------------

1) Account data is stored within the webroot (XML mode):

http://tcms.webserver.com/data/tcms_user/<random-val>.xml, where <random
val> is string composed of 5 bytes (e.g. 2ac336ff0d.xml). Each XML file
contains username (base64) and password (MD5) of a single user.

This is particularly dangerous if the webserver allows directory listing.

2) Session data is stored within the webroot:

http://tcms.webserver.com/engine/admin/<user-id>.xml (XML mode). The
session files are created once a user logs in to the CMS, so we just
have to monitor this directory to steal his credentials.

This is particularly dangerous if the webserver allows directory listing.

3) Directory Traversal / reading of arbitrary files (XML mode):

http://tcms.webserver.com/engine/admin/admin.php?id_user=
../../../../../../etc/passwd

4) Arbitrary file uploads:

Once we have gained access to the administrator interface, we can use
the gallery scripts to upload arbitrary files to:

http://tcms.webserver.com/data/images/albums/

No content-type or file validation checks are in place, so this is the
easiest way to get shell access.

Additional Remarks:
---------------

These flaws were found during a pentest, in an environment with
MAGIC_QUOTES_GPC activated. Please do NOT try to use toendaCMS without
MAGIC_QUOTES and other safeguards, unless you plan to run a honeypot or
have another particular reason for being very vulnerable.

Vendor status:
---------------
vendor notified: 2005-10-26
vendor response: 2005-10-30
patch available: 2005-11-01

The issues described in this advisory have been addressed in the latest
version of toendaCMS (0.6.2 stable). Download at:

http://www.toenda.com/de/data/files/Software/toendaCMS_Version_0.6.0_Stable/toendaCMS_0.6.2_Stable.zip

General remarks
---------------
We would like to apologize in advance for potential nonconformities
and/or known issues.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Unternehmensberatung GmbH

Office Vienna
Blindengasse 3
A-1080 Wien
Austria

Tel.: +43 / 1 / 409 0307 - 570
Fax.: +43 / 1 / 409 0307 - 590
Mail: office at sec-consult dot com
www.sec-consult.com

EOF Bernhard Mueller / @2005
bmu at sec-consult dot com