full-disclosure - Google Talk cleartext credentials in process memory

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Date: Tue Nov 29 19:39:17 2005
From: guninski at guninski.com (Georgi Guninski)
Subject: Google Talk cleartext credentials in process
	memory

On Tue, Nov 29, 2005 at 01:11:47PM -0500, Nasko Oskov wrote:
>  
> If you want to protect the credentials in memory from dumps that go to
> Microsoft, why not use CryptProtectMemory() instead of home-grown
> obfuscation? This function encrypts the memory with a key that changes
> over reboots, so even if you send a dump to MS, they wouldn't know how
> to decrypt it.
>

old people remember the "nsakey micro$oft" fiasco.

-------------
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY
_NSAKEY is a variable name discovered in Windows NT 4 Service Pack 5 (which
had been released unstripped of its symbolic debugging data) in August 1999
by Andrew D. Fernandes of Cryptonym Corporation. That variable contained a
1024-bit public key.
....
The key is still present in all version of Windows, though it has been
renamed "_KEY2."
-------------

-- 
where do you want bill gates to go today?