full-disclosure - Google Talk cleartext credentials in process memory

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Date: Tue Nov 29 09:53:38 2005
From: sloik at parareal.net (Jaroslaw Sajko)
Subject: Google Talk cleartext credentials in process
	memory

pagvac wrote:
> Title: Google Talk Beta Messenger cleartext credentials in process memory
> 
> 
> Description
> 
> Google Talk stores all user credentials (username and password) in
> clear-text in the process memory. Such vulnerability was found on
> August 25, 2005 (two days after the release of Google Talk) and has
> already been patched by Google.
> 
> This issue would occur regardless of whether the "Save Password"
> feature was enabled or not.

The same issue concerns many applications, ie. Gadu-Gadu - another
instant messenger. In my opinion such "vulnerabilities" are not worthy
publishing (for Gadu-Gadu we have not published this kind of software
behaviour) because if you can dump other user process or trick him to
execute any code then reading the password from the process memory is
only one of many things which you can do.

regards,
js