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Date: Fri Dec 16 03:08:36 2005 From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu) Subject: Symlink attack techniques On Thu, 15 Dec 2005 18:14:51 CST, James Longstreet said: > Since it doesn't seem like you can control what gets written to the > file, you probably can't directly get root access from there. The > output could have some ill effect if written to the correct file... > hard to know without knowing what the output is. > Of course, as was already suggested, you can be malicious and > destructive and destroy /etc/passwd (or any other file on the > system), but I don't see right away how to gain root from that. The trick here is to find some file where the mere *existence* of the file will alter the behavior of something. Obvious targets include /etc/hosts.equiv on boxes still running the BSD r* commands, or things like /etc/cron.allow. Other possibilities include finding a cron job or frequently run program that will misbehave if it can't open a file with open(..O_EXCL), and so on.... It almost certainly won't get you root by itself, but it may be possible to use it to leverage a second vulnerability that you wouldn't otherwise be able to use.... -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 226 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20051215/73bd9b51/attachment.bin
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