lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sat Apr  1 00:06:05 2006
From: n3td3v at gmail.com (n3td3v)
Subject: Re: RSA HAVE CRACKED PHISHING, NO SERIOUSLY

With this in mind, are the RSA say its OK to DDoS fake login pages that the
public think are phishing sites with fake information to take the phishing
sites down? Or maybe the RSA didn't think too far into it before making
their "illegal tactics" public. I guess nobody in the industry learned from
makelovenotspam.com and the whole Lycos affair.

On 3/31/06, n3td3v <n3td3v@...il.com> wrote:
>
> But do you remmeber back to the Make love not spam saga? Yeah, the big
> players tried to "attack" the bad guys and look were they ended up. You, by
> attacking anything, forwhatever reason, with the same method as the
> attacker, could land you in jail. While with your attack you may lock up
> phishers in coordination with banks, the phishers lawyers could also claim
> by law, that the anti-phishing site was also breaking the law by flooding a
> database, even if the database is malicious or otherwise legitmate,
>
>
> On 3/31/06, Steven <steven@...ebug.org> wrote:
> >
> > Well I think they took a pretty neat and somewhat unique approach to the
> > whole thing.  I don't think the claim to have thought of some
> > groundbreaking
> > perfect solution to stop phishers.  However, they are combing through
> > over a
> > billion e-mails a day and looking for a phishing sites.  They've tied
> > themselves into some top vendors and are working to get the sites shut
> > down.
> > They are actually making calls and sending e-mails that have been
> > translated
> > appropriately.  On top of that they are flooding the sites with bogus
> > information.  How exactly they are doing that.. I don't know.  Are they
> > using different sessions and IP addresses for each bogus request they
> > send?
> > Are they typing in gibberish or stuff that appears completely legit?  As
> > many of us know, credit card numbers can instantly be checked to see if
> > they
> > are even a valid number before you even go through the process of
> > verifying
> > expiration, zip code, cvv, or anything else.  Is this company actually
> > taking credit card numbers that could potentiallity be legit account
> > numbers
> > and inserting them?  If not then it would be only take seconds to sort
> > through hundreds of fake and real account numbers.
> >
> > Anyway -- I am not sure how they are doing everything, but they are
> > taking a
> > better approach than many.  Maybe some of the boneheads lurking about
> > this
> > mailing list and reply back and let us know if they've been thwarted by
> > this
> > company in any way. :-)
> >
> > Steven
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "ducki3" < duckie37@...il.com>
> > To: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
> > Sent: Friday, March 31, 2006 5:04 PM
> > Subject: [Full-disclosure] Re: RSA HAVE CRACKED PHISHING, NO SERIOUSLY
> >
> >
> > > In any case, it's clear that the person who posted that response has
> > *no
> > > idea*
> > > how most bank's anti-fraud systems work.
> > >
> > > First off, the phishers *can't* just run through all the data they've
> > > gotten
> > > in just a few seconds, unless they distributed the work across a bunch
> > of
> > > botnet
> > > zombies - hits for more than a few dozen different accounts from the
> > same
> > > IP
> > > in the same timespan are suspicious at the very least.
> > >
> > > Secondly, the phishers can currently usually be sure that the victims
> > have
> > > given them reasonably good data (unless the victim is a dweeb who
> > can't
> > > enter
> > > their DoB or account number correctly).  On the other hand, if the
> > phished
> > > data
> > > has been polluted by 90% bad data, then only 1 of 10 attempted
> > > transactions
> > > will succeed - and the fact that they're trying lots of different bad
> > data
> > > will
> > > again hopefully trigger an alert.  If you only succeed every 10th
> > time,
> > > and you
> > > get locked out after 3 attempts with different bad data, it's going to
> > > take you
> > > a lot longer to figure out which ones are good and which ones are
> > bad....
> >
> >
> > Consider that some of these fake accounts could also be used as Honey
> > keys.
> > They would of course have to work in conjunction with the banks /
> > sites to utilize this.
> >
> > It would be rather difficult for a phisher to sort through thousands
> > of Id's when IP addresses keep getting shut off based on a Honey Key.
> >
> > You would have to own a lot of BOTs and a lot of patience.
> >
> >
> > Duck
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20060401/7d6c8f84/attachment.html

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ