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Date: Tue Jun 6 07:26:40 2006 From: joeljose420 at gmail.com (Joel Jose) Subject: Re: blocking tor is not the right way forward. It may just be the right way backward. see, its pitty how we dont understand that we are trying to defend using the wrong principles. just like the other poster pointed out.. protect your data == plug holes + preserve + restore data.. != go for a witch hunt. moreover.. we when "blocking" tor and denying access are assuming 3 things : 1) tor cannot be recreated(dont bet on that.. imagine a tor-2 network which corrects(takes different policy measures) the blacklisting facility, if we hold the rope so tight as to choke.. the privacy people and the community will come up with a better and more effective tool.. ) 2) scarce resources is the way forward. Cmon public open proxies, tor like public projects..etc are not "scarce" resource for the attacker.. but it is a scarce resource for the users... dont get fooled.. ofcourse all it takes for a determined(and well funded) attacker is "shift" his cables to get onto a different network to attack you ;) 3)TOR is not the problem.. its a solution for privacy... it would be much better if you try to find time to code for better webserver protections against a dos.. or even write a patch for that new full-disclosure vulnerability.. did i say proof-of-concept.. yikes.. ;) PS : ofcourse right now discussions are on on how to "label" / "mark" tor users so that CIA triad is maintained for resources accessed by tor users having different access privileges. psuedonyms are a serious model thats being considered and researched... joel. On 6/4/06, Tonnerre Lombard <tonnerre.lombard@...roup.ch> wrote: > Salut, > > On Sat, 2006-06-03 at 16:15 -0400, John Sprocket wrote: > > i imagine a forensics person looks and sees a tor ip and thinks "okay. > > i just deadended. there's nothing i can do because this is a tor exit > > node." with a botnet, most bots can be traced back to their meeting > > point which is a little bit more useful. > > The question is also whether one should actually waste one's time trying > to figure out who actually conducted the intrusion. When one of our > systems gets broken into, I spend my time figuring out what happened, > which data got corrupted, and then I fix the hole the intruder used and > rebuild the system. > > There isn't much use in trying to find someone to punish for the fact > that one was running insecure software. The only legitimate thing to do > in this situation is to fix the hole and to carry on working. > > If it was so easy to sue away all intruders, why would anyone ever hire > a pentester? > > Anyway, I'm not sure whether this non-technical implication of a > specific technical product should really be discussed here. It's not > exactly a vulnerability after all, while of course the vulnerability the > attacker used to bite Jason surely was one. > > Wrong end, people... > > Tonnerre > -- > SyGroup GmbH > Tonnerre Lombard > > Loesungen mit System > Tel:+41 61 333 80 33 Roeschenzerstrasse 9 > Fax:+41 61 383 14 67 4153 Reinach > Web:www.sygroup.ch tonnerre.lombard@...roup.ch > > -- As soon as men decide that all means are permitted to fight an evil, then their good becomes indistinguishable from the evil that they set out to destroy. - Christopher Dawson, The Judgment of Nations
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