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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2007 14:38:23 -0400 From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com> To: vulnwatch@...nwatch.org, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 10.30.07: IBM AIX bellmail Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability IBM AIX bellmail Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability iDefense Security Advisory 10.30.07 http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/ Oct 30, 2007 I. BACKGROUND bellmail is a mail user-agent (MUA) and is commonly used for accessing locally stored electronic mail messages. Under AIX, the bellmail program is installed by default and is set-uid root. More information can be found at the URL shown. http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/pseries/v5r3/topic/com.ibm.aix.commadmn/doc/commadmndita/mail_bellmail.htm II. DESCRIPTION Local exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in the bellmail program of IBM Corp.'s AIX operating system allows attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges. The problem specifically exists within sendrmt function. This function is called when a user tries to send mail using the "m" command. Within this function, several sprintf calls are made to concatenate user-supplied input with static strings. No bounds checking is performed to ensure that the resulting string will fit in the destination buffer located on the stack. By supplying a long parameter, an attacker is able to overwrite program control data located on the stack and take control of the affected process. III. ANALYSIS Exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges. Local access is required to execute and interact with the bellmail program. It should be noted that the bellmail program does initially set its user (both saved and effective) to that of the calling user. Generally, it would be sufficient to drop these privileges. However, in this case, the bellmail program uses the AIX-specific setpriv functionality to retain the ability chown arbitrary files on the system. IV. DETECTION iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability within AIX version 5.3 (5300-06) and 5.2. Previous versions are suspected to be vulnerable. V. WORKAROUND Removing the set-uid bit from the bellmail program will protect against exploitation. However, doing so will render the program unusable. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE IBM Corp. has addressed this vulnerability by releasing interim fixes. More information can be found via the Bulletins tab of IBM's Subscription Service for UNIX and Linux servers. You can reach this service by clicking the URL shown below. http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/subscriptions/pqvcmjd?mode=1 VII. CVE INFORMATION The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2007-4623 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 08/28/2007 Initial vendor notification 08/28/2007 Initial vendor response 10/30/2007 Coordinated public disclosure IX. CREDIT This vulnerability was discovered by Joshua J. Drake of VeriSign iDefense Labs. Get paid for vulnerability research http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php Free tools, research and upcoming events http://labs.idefense.com/ X. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright © 2007 iDefense, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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