Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2008 22:25:06 +0100
From: n3td3v <xploitable@...il.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Let's make a spy-proof communications
	infrastructure

On Sun, Jun 29, 2008 at 6:24 PM, Mary and Glenn Everhart <Everhart@....com>
wrote:

> Colleagues:
>
> It is unworthy that people should be spending energy criticizing
> others' qualifications, personal habits, ancestry and destination (as
> the wording goes).
>
> I suspect that something much more useful can be possibly facilitated
> here (and elsewhere if anyone feels like it).
>
> Let me suggest that it should be possible to construct something like a
> cell phone network which will run like a peer to peer network, with
> routing determined heuristically and pretty much unpredictably, with
> message encryption, and with small enough electronics to package
> in something no larger than current cell phones.
>
> The current designs we have are the creatures of the old phone companies
> and presume things go through central offices. This has led to intrusions
> into user privacy by crooks and governments, and tends to make all manner
> of information we might not care to publish become effectively wide open
> to anyone who cares to steal it.
>
> However, consider that many internet p2p networks have been worked out
> (and are still being) to hide some of this. Consider that the old usenet
> protocol has no idea of global source or destination (though its flood
> fill algorithm is I suspect way too slow, still, to be used for messaging
> or voice traffic). If a network is designed so that every member only
> has some idea of its neighbors and which of them might be closer to the
> desired endpoint than it is, each node only has or needs a very local
> idea of addressing - something that might be relatively useless to
> central authorities or to crooks.
>
> The electronics to receive and send messages locally can be made very
> small and cheap. There are low power CPUs from places like TI and Atmel
> that run on microwatts, and WWV receivers can be had for $1 in chip
> form in bulk (per messages I have gotten). We have GPS boxes that
> you hold in your hand able to receive satellite transmissions. A few
> years back this would have been thought energetically impossible.
>
> If we devised some private communicator, it might expect to function
> in a very large net so long as some path existed to other communicators.
> While truly global routing might require some relays to bridge areas
> with few people, in urban areas and quite a few not-so-urban ones direct
> communication should be workable, at low enough power on any single
> frequency
> (yeah, make it spread spectrum) that formal licensing would not be needed.
>
> It should be noted that the address of any such system need not be
> fixed for huge times. To the extent you can get the systems to read,
> say, a time synchronization signal, systems might simply pick new addresses
> out of a suitably long number space. (If this is truly random, address
> collisions might be made so rare they can be ignored.) This would
> mean routing would need to be recomputed locally every so often but
> would make the notion of global address pretty well meaningless and
> unpredictable. (Use a heat source perhaps to generate random bits, so
> the randomness is from thermal noise. Nobody will be able to steal
> a key and figure the next address, or the last...). If a broadcast were
> available so each unit could sense nearby ones (where you make "nearby"
> as far away as you can) the constantly changing addresses won't cause
> problems discovering what else exists. If you have to scan an area,
> such discovery could be unsecurable. While I mention discovering where
> one is on a mesh, this might be tried with and without actual geographic
> coordinates. Nearness measured by a Hamming distance could be used for
> routing also. It might not be as efficient but if it worked it would
> mean routing gave eavesdroppers no hint as to physical location of
> anyone. If we want to keep private conversations private, this seems
> like a good thing.
>
> Authenticating people is I think separable from this; I have some other
> schemes to handle that. For a communicator, encryption should basically
> make traffic snooping impossible and make routing snooping infeasible
> even with adversaries who listen to a lot of traffic. The lessons of
> Blackberry should be heeded here: make the encryption all end to end,
> not step by step, with no backdoors built in and with open source code
> so tampering with these principles can be quickly caught and negated.
>
> Building such gadgets would be paid for by people wanting to use them,
> but note that the necessary infrastructure is just the existence of
> a large bunch of these things being used, sitting on peoples' belts or
> in pockets and passing traffic among one another. You start selling
> them in small offices or families, where the necessary groups will tend
> to be together a lot. Gradually people will notice that they can
> reach others.
>
> How to address some particular person then?
>
> I would suggest that some of the p2p research might be useful here.
> Perhaps have the gadget transmit a name or other identifier of the
> person there in some form. If for example we allow repositories
> of public keys, we might transmit "John Smith has address xxxxxxxxxxxx"
> where xxxxxxxxxx is encrypted by his private key. (This is not very good.)
> If a few trusted nodes can be made, they can be used in setting up
> connections by finding the current addresses.
>
> If I wanted to talk to John Smith and could find a partial address
> for him from some repository I might transmit some of my
> address encrypted by his public key and my name, and it might
> be noticed by John Smith's communicator and full address sent
> back. This kind of thing gets somewhat better, since not everything
> gets sent at once. It is still not great.
>
> It is probably best for routing to have all units be able to be
> opportunistic
> routers, so that there would be a large and often - changing set of
> routers in any area having information about some addressees. You will
> need some way
> to convert an identifier "name" to a network address, probably in several
> pieces to make it hard to fake.
>
> It is probably worth thinking about a "web of trust" here and having ways
> to declare identifiers as trustworthy or others as to be shunned. Phil
> Zimmermann wrote much about this in conjunction with pgp, and such
> function may be necessary in some places to keep eavesdroppers from
> hammering parts of the network to try to analyze it. Here too I would
> suggest that distributing the decision function could make it harder
> to subvert.
>
> This is all pretty schematic, but if a private communicator like this
> were devised, our networked conversations might be able to again be
> private as they were years back when you just went out behind the barn
> to speak privately, and could be pretty well sure nobody else heard.
>
> I think a world in which it is harder for your every move to be tracked
> will be harder for anyone to take over and will tempt people less
> who now think they can watch your speech and predict you might do
> something they dislike.
>
> However please if anyone wants to discuss this, I would ask that
> priority be given to what technically can or cannot work, what
> actually might protect or what will fail and perhaps be a boon
> to eavesdroppers, how much stego is needed in here, or other such
> topics. I suspect there is enough technical savvy around now to build
> something along these lines (and having said so in public, I may
> be said to have let the only important cat out of the bag). Anyone
> want to add or detract?
>
> (The foregoing is not un-holey and certainly not all that would be
> needed.)
>
> Can people here propose something that is still better?
>
> Glenn Everhart
>

Yes as i've been saying already the intelligence services for years like
MI5, MI6 have been laughing at Full-Disclosure for years about us and the
media getting excited about internet explorer, fire fox, opera, safari drama
and the other likes.

While that may be stimulating for some, it hasn't chipped a single inch out
of the government and the intelligence services.

The biggest government hack of all time? Some faggot weirdo called Gary
Mckinnon probing the Pentagon and other government networks with a text file
of manufacturer default passwords, and he is about to be extradited to the
U.S.A for it and be put in jail for 65 years, lmao!!!

The government are laughing their asses off at how softcore the world elite
hackers are, we need to crank up a gear and give the government something to
think about.

I'm not talking about anything illegal or breaking the law, i'm talking
about lawful critical vulnerability discosure on the mailing lists thats
going to make the intelligence services and the government wake up and bring
real credibility to the mailing list.

Right now, folks releasing quicktime flaws and other gay shit, thats so
1999, its time to research and disclose stuff thats going to get you stopped
at passport control and have your vulnerability research taken off you for
analysis when you plan to do a speech at a security conference etc.

Like say, we need to move away from gay shit, and think about the government
and the intelligence services, they are currently walking all over all of
us, its time to get even technically.

All the best,

n3td3v

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