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Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2008 08:06:25 -0700
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@...workresonance.com>
To: "Ben Laurie" <benl@...gle.com>
Cc: security@...nid.net, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, OpenID List <general@...nid.net>,
cryptography@...zdowd.com
Subject: Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning
advisory
At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100,
Ben Laurie wrote:
> However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this
> means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of
> the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user
> behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the
> attack.
>
> Therefore mitigation falls to other parties.
>
> 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default.
Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client
side?
-Ekr
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