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Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2008 19:19:47 +0100
From: n3td3v <xploitable@...il.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Fwd: Oyster card hack details revealed

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: n3td3v <xploitable@...il.com>
Date: Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 6:37 PM
Subject: Oyster card hack details revealed
To: n3td3v <n3td3v@...glegroups.com>


Details of how to hack one of the world's most popular smartcards have
been published online.

The research by Professor Bart Jacobs and colleagues at Radboud
University in Holland reveals a weakness in the widely used Mifare
Classic RFID chip.

This is used in building entry systems and is embedded in the Oyster
card used on London's transport network.

Publication of the research was delayed by legal action taken by the
chip's manufacturer.

Paper chase

Prof Jacobs and his team first identified the vulnerability in a
research paper that was due to be published in March 2008.

However, the release of the article was delayed after chip
manufacturer NXP attempted to secure a court injunction against its
publication.

The paper was finally released on Monday at the European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security (Esorics) 2008 security conference held
in Malaga, Spain.

Sensitive data stored on the Mifare Classic chip is protected by a
unique number that acts as a key. When the chip, or a card bearing it,
is placed near a reader it transmits and receives information based on
its key. The security of the system depends on the key remaining
secret.

In March Prof Jacobs and his colleagues discovered a flaw in the
chip's design which makes those keys easy to calculate and copy.

"Once we knew how the system worked and what the vulnerabilities were,
it turned out to be very simple to actually clone cards, steal
someone's identity and enter a building as someone else", he said.

After making the discovery the researchers informed the Dutch
government and the chip's manufacturer, NXP.

When it knew about the research NXP moved to delay publication by
seeking an injunction.

Steve Owen, vice president of sales and marketing - identification at
NXP Semiconductors, told the BBC's Click programme that it was
motivated to take legal action to give its customers time to update
their systems.

"We sought the injunction to cause a delay, not to completely stop the
publication," he said.

Mr Owen recommends that the card alone should not be relied upon for
secure access to buildings.

"We do not recommend the use of Mifare Classic for new installations,"
said Mr Owen. "We are working with customers to review their
security."

Spot check

The Mifare Classic is widely used on many public transport systems
including the Oyster card in London. The researchers say their
security flaw can be used to copy cards. They claim to have even been
able to adjust the amount of credit stored on a pre-pay card.

Earlier this year members of Prof Jacobs's team visited London to test
their findings, travelling on the London Underground using a modified
Oyster card.

Shashi Verma, director of fares and ticketing at Transport For London,
told the BBC its system spotted the security breach.

"We knew about it before we were informed by the students," said Mr Verma

He stressed that the Mifare Classic chip in the Oyster card is only
part of a larger system. "A number of forensic controls run within the
back office systems which is something that customers and these
students have no ability to touch."

"We will carry on making improvements to the security of the Oyster system."

Speaking in July, security expert Bruce Schneier said: "As bad as the
damage is from publishing - and there probably will be some - the
damage is much, much worse by not disclosing."

Mr Schneier said it was a "dangerous assumption" to think that the
researchers were the only ones that knew about weaknesses with Mifare.

"Assume organised crime knows about this, assume they will be selling
it anyway," he said.

Commenting on the publication of their research, Prof Jacobs told
Click the information being disclosed was: "not a guidebook for
attacks".

This report will be broadcast in this week's edition of Click on
Saturday 11 October at 1130 BST on the BBC News Channel. It will also
air on BBC World - check here for transmission times.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/click_online/7655292.stm

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