full-disclosure - Re: Apple Safari ... DoS Vulnerability

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Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2009 18:09:30 +0100
From: Thierry Zoller <Thierry@...ler.lu>
To: Michael Krymson <krymson@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Apple Safari ... DoS Vulnerability

Dear Michael,
I understand your point, however consider that
your examples are showing the different *impacts* of a DoS condition.

A bug becomes a security problem once it violates at least one of the three
letters C or I or A. That's the point. The impact and risk assesement
is to be done later on and can only be done partialy by a vendor since
the use of the affected products sometimes heavily depends on the
implementation or use case.

MK> I would suggest that DoS conditions are not a priori security issues, but it
MK> certainly depends on the context and whether security has or could have an
MK> *interest* in them.

This is not to be measured or estimated completely by a vendor
but the client/user/integrator of said products in their specific
enviroment and use and abuse cases. For example Internet Kiosk vendors.

-- 
http://secdev.zoller.lu
Thierry Zoller

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