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Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 13:09:55 +0100
From: Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@...il.com>
To: craig.wright@...ormation-defense.com
Cc: "McGhee, Eddie" <Eddie.McGhee@....com>,
	full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	security-basics@...urityfocus.com,
	"Thor \(Hammer of God\)" <Thor@...merofgod.com>
Subject: Re: Risk measurements

Dr. Craig,

Again, why aim at getting probabilistic results when a system is known
to be flawed? Might as well use the budget on fix such a system, no?
There's a time for finding fancy interesting numbers and a time to get
the system going with the least flaws possible.
Why should any entity bother with risk modeling if it is not used at all?
Here's the real question to the subject; What does risk modeling fix?

Regards,
Christian Sciberras.





On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 8:45 PM, Craig S. Wright
<craig.wright@...ormation-defense.com> wrote:
> The simple answer to these posts is that I am passionate about this topic.
> This has allowed me to be drawn into a flame war with Tim, something he is
> far better at.
>
> Risk and economics matter to security. Like it or not, money is a limited
> resource and spending it on the most effective measures that return more
> effective results means something. Going to management with another request
> for more money means taking funds from some other place where it may be
> better utilised.
>
> In a few weeks I am submitting a series of papers on risk modelling. These
> are being submitted to IEEE and other peer reviewed papers. Together, these
> form the foundation of an expert system. As Tim and others assert, the use
> of mathematically based systems is not perfect. This is what probability
> means. I have not aimed at perfection, that is a fools errant. I have aimed
> at economical optimality. This is the best result for the best economic
> return. This can be argued in a heated debate, but the matter is not
>
> These papers will be public domain. At this point, the answer is simple, the
> assertions I make in them can be tested. I do not assert that they will lead
> to perfect calculations of what will occur. If this was true, it would not
> be risk. By its very definition, risk is a probabilistic function. Many
> people in the industry seem to forget this.
>
> An expert system does not have to be perfect to have value. It needs to be
> better than what we do now. What we do now is commonly no better than taking
> one number that an expert makes up and multiplying this by another made up
> number. A system that works within a confidence bound will miss some
> instances of attack. By definition. The difference is that the number of
> errors can also be predicted. You may not know which system gets
> compromised, but you can estimate how many will be compromised over a time
> period. For an organisation this has value.
>
> This matters as management can see make a choice based on reason. Some
> servers get compromised, but the cost of this occurring can be planned and
> if the cost of a compromise is less than the fix, then the fix is not
> effective.
>
> "Everybody knows that you can't model risk".
> Once, everybody know that the earth was the centre of the universe. That the
> stars are just holes in the carpet of the sky. Rhetoric has no scientific
> value. Some people, such as Tim may use this in a demagogical manner to
> cover the facts. This is a common political attack. The issue is that it has
> no alignment to truth. Truth is based on fact. The scientific method is a
> valid measure and little else is.
>
> So, slur me, attack my character, and do whatever else seems fit. The end
> result is that I shall publish later this year. These will be in peer
> reviewed journals and conferences.
>
> I cannot win at a flame war nor against rhetoric. I am not inclined to be a
> sophist. The simple answer will come from testing the models and systems I
> shall be publishing. If they do better than existing risk guessing, they are
> valuable. If they save money, they are valuable.
>
> Regards,
> ...
> Dr. Craig S Wright GSE-Malware, GSE-Compliance, LLM, & ...
> Information Defense Pty Ltd
>
>
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