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Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2010 22:06:42 +0000
From: Brandon Enright <bmenrigh@...d.edu>
To: "Thor (Hammer Of God)" <thor@...merofgod.com>
Cc: "<full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Introducing TGP...

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On Mon, 14 Jun 2010 09:52:12 -0700
"Thor (Hammer Of God)" <thor@...merofgod.com> wrote:

> You don't think I considered it?  Really?  You think that I would go  
> through the trouble of designing and implenting a standards based  
> encrytion application without considering that it could be cracked?
> 
> You are incorrect. I certainly considered it. I just know that when  
> brute forcing AES256 becomes feasible, a scan of mynpssport will be  
> the last thing on anyone mind.

Brute forcing AES256 will never be feasible.  Factoring your RSA key
will be -- soon too.

> 
> How does this differ from SSL, and why do you think I would have to
> be "live on the wire" to crack it?
> 
> If your entire argument is "it can be cracked at some point" then
> you argue against *any* type of encrytion.
> 
> Postulative statements in the obvious are a waste of people's time.
> 
> T


You're using a 1024 bit key here which seems a bit gutsy ;-)  

Without better attacks, you basically have:

Brute force AES 256 -> O(2^256)
Bruce force your 20 char password -> roughly O(2^(20*7)) == O(2^140)
Factor your 1024 bit public modulus -> roughly O(2^80)

Since a 768 bit RSA key has already been factored I'd say you only have
a few years before a moderately sized cluster could factor your public
key.

Of course, as I write this I realize I'm about to sign this message
with a 1024 bit DSA key...

Brandon

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