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Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2011 17:04:10 +1000
From: Inc Leartext <staff@...leartext.com>
To: Peter Osterberg <j@....nu>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: password.incleartext.com

Hi FD,

thanks Thor for the secure version of the recovery process... we will make
sure we include a time component during our testing process to ensure no
human interaction is involved.

We are now on twitter to add some lulz and media whoring:
https://twitter.com/#!/incleartext.

Cheers,
Inc Leartext.

On Thu, Apr 7, 2011 at 4:38 PM, Peter Osterberg <j@....nu> wrote:

>  I can see how it can be stored securely, but how would distribution after
> recovery be accomplished?
>
> In an envelope? Or by sending me a one-time random https-link where I can
> retrieve it myself? Sounds like more trouble compared to what can be gained
> from it. Wouldn't it be just as easy to send a one time password that needs
> to be changed... Too impracitcal to be implemented in a real-world
> situation...
>
> This is probably why I still wouldn't hesitate to say that it is insecure
> if it is in clear text. Even though I must give you credit for having shown
> a way to do it. ;-)
>
> I am sure someone will come and beat me with saying that they already did
> this. :-p Ppl do all sorts of crazy stuff just because they can...
>
> Thor (Hammer of God) skrev 2011-04-07 06:27:
>
>  One way to handle this would be to take the password on signup and both
> hash it and encrypt it with the recovery key’s public key in 2 separate
> fields (a hash field and an encrypted field).  That way you’ve always got a
> hash of it for validation even if you lose the keys.   Of course, you could
> still always re-encrypt it to see if the two values matched, but I would
> probably continue to use the hash for logon validation.
>
>
>
> The private key would be stored on a completely separate machine/instance
> which was only used for recovery purposes.   There could be any number of
> ways to validate the actual recovery request, but that way you separate out
> the encrypted data from any on-machine ability to decrypt it.   I wouldn’t
> have the private key in memory on the same box because that makes it trivial
> to decrypt, but of course it all depends on what problem we are trying to
> solve.
>
>
>
> t
>
>
>
> *From:* Cal Leeming [mailto:cal@...whisper.co.uk <cal@...whisper.co.uk>]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:58 AM
> *To:* Peter Osterberg
> *Cc:* Thor (Hammer of God); Mario Vilas; Romain Bourdy; full-disclosure;
> Inc leartext
> *Subject:* Re: [Full-disclosure] password.incleartext.com
>
>
>
> Tbh, I'd be unhappy about any company storing a password in anything other
> than a hash of itself. But, like many things in life, we have absolutely no
> control over it, so best to just use a new pass for every external service
> :)
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 7:48 PM, Peter Osterberg <j@....nu> wrote:
>
> Security is relative and the pwd might be handled in a secure enough
> fashion compared to the value of the information it is protecting, even
> though it is stored in a reversable fashion. But I wouldn't, generally
> speaking, hesitate to claim that it isn't stored securely if it is
> reversable.
>
> Could you givd an example?
>
> ----- Ursprungsmeddelande -----
>
> > This isn't necessarily true - without knowledge of how the data may be
> > encrypted and what processes are involved in decrypting the data, one
> > can't make the "it isn't secure" statement.
> >
> > That being said, it is probably safe to argue that sites that do not
> > require PCI, SOX, HIPPA, etc would be less inclined to engage in this
> > level of security.  But that doesn't mean that it is not being done.
> >
> > t
> >
> > From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk
> > [mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk<full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk>]
> On Behalf Of Mario
> > Vilas Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 9:05 AM To: Romain Bourdy
> > Cc: full-disclosure; Inc leartext
> > Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] password.incleartext.com
> >
> > Actually, if they can get the data back (be it because it's stored in
> > plaintext or in obfuscated plaintext) then it's not secure. Obfuscation
> > doesn't make it more secure, or any less plaintext. On Wed, Apr 6, 2011
> > at 11:01 AM, Romain Bourdy
>
> > <achileos@...il.com<mailto:achileos@...il.com <achileos@...il.com>>>
> wrote: Hi
>
> > Full-Disclosure,
> >
> > Just my two cents but ... the fact they can give your password back
> > doesn't mean it's stored in cleartext, just that it's not hashed but
> > encrypted with some way to get the original data back, this doesn't mean
> > at all it's not secured, even though in most case it's not.
> >
> >  -Romain
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 1:36 PM,
>
> > <Maksim.Filenko@...b.com<mailto:Maksim.Filenko@...b.com<Maksim.Filenko@...b.com>>>
> wrote: Kinda
> > plaintextoffenders.com<http://plaintextoffenders.com>?
> >
> > wbr,
> >  - Max
> >
> > full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk<
> mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk<full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk>>
>
>
> > wrote on 01.04.2011 02:17:24:
> >
>
> > > Inc leartext <staff@...leartext.com<mailto:staff@...leartext.com<staff@...leartext.com>>>
>
> > > Sent by:
> > > full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk<
> mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk<full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk>>
>
>
> > >
> > > 01.04.2011 13:14
> > >
> > > To
> > >
>
> > > full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk<
> mailto:full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk<full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>>
>
> > >
> > > cc
> > >
> > > Subject
> > >
> > > [Full-disclosure]
> > > password.incleartext.com<http://password.incleartext.com&gt;
>
> > >
> > > Hi FD,
> > >
> > > Just launched a new website to keep a list of websites storing
> > > passwords in clear text, so far the database is small but feel free
> > > to add some:
> > > http://password.incleartext.com/
> >
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Inc Leartext_______________________________________________
> > > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > "My daughter was asked by a little old lady in a London hotel restaurant
> > what her daddy did - she answered, 'He's a pirate.' I was very proud of
> > that answer." - Johnny Depp
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
>
>
>

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