full-disclosure - Re: silly PoCs continue: X-Frame-Options give you less than expected

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Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2011 23:29:27 +0000
From: Dave <mrx@...pergander.org.uk>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: silly PoCs continue: X-Frame-Options give you
 less than expected

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On 10/12/2011 22:39, Michal Zalewski wrote:
> At the risk of annoying everyone...
> 
> I think we greatly underappreciate the extent to which JavaScript
> allows you to exploit the limits of human perception. On modern
> high-performance systems, windows can be opened, positioned, and
> closed; and documents loaded and then navigated away from; so quickly
> that we can't even reliably notice that, let alone react consciously.
> 
> The PoC I posted here earlier this week
> (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/switch/) demonstrates one example of page
> transitions occurring so fast that you don't register it; and some of
> my earlier posts outlined the exploitation of page switching to
> exploit browser UIs (e.g. http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/ffgeo2/). Today,
> I wanted to share this brief demonstration of an attack that should
> hopefully illustrate why our current way of thinking about
> clickjacking (and the possible defenses, such as X-Frame-Options) is
> flawed:
> 
> http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/clickit/
> 
> The basic idea here is that instead of placing the UI you want to
> tamper with in an invisible or only partly-visible <iframe>, you can
> achieve a similar effect simply by predicting the time of a
> premeditated click (which is fairly easy if you look at mouse velocity
> and distance to the expected destination), and then either destroying
> the current window, or navigating to a different document (in this
> case, a cheesy banking site).
> 
> While everything about this exploit is extremely goofy, and I put no
> effort into making the transitions less obvious, it should still
> demonstrate the issue neatly.
> 
> /mz
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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> 

Looks Like I won Michal. Where's my prize?

Clever stuff.

This kind of thing has occurred to me as system and indeed network/broadband speed have increased. One time a flashing of a neon on a router or
modem or the a flash of a window on a desktop gave some indication of data ingress or egress. Nowadays it's done and over with before the user
even realises something is afoot.

I had to enable Javascript though. I guess I trust you not to burn my ass. There are not many links posted on this list which I would click with
javascript enabled.

Thanks for your insights and the education

Dave

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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