full-disclosure - Re: Fwd: VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)

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Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 14:08:07 -0500
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@...hat.com>
Cc: "HI-TECH ." <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com>,
	Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Fwd: VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)

On Mon, 12 Dec 2011 13:31:21 EST, Ramon de C Valle said:

> This is a good question. Actually, we shouldn't allow ftpd_t read the locale files from within user_home_t directories.

To fill in the SELinux details for the people following along at home:

The problem is that at open() time, there's no good way to specify what the
expected label is (now *that* might be an interesting extention to open() for
some enterprisng grad student) - so as long as the file has *any* foo_t label
that the program is allowed to access, the open() will succeed.  There's no way
for it to say "I'm opening what *should* be a locale_t file, so if I'm being
coerced into opening a user_foo_t, please nuke the request".

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