full-disclosure - Re: Predefined Post Authentication Session ID Vulnerability

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Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2012 09:15:32 -0400
From: genericone@...hmail.com
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: 
	Predefined Post Authentication Session ID	Vulnerability

Benji,

Do you write anything but scathing criticism?  I've never seen you
contribute anything of use to this list.   You must be a real pleasure
in person.
 Sent using Hushmail
On 07/12/2012 at 4:52 AM, Benji  wrote:Ah, please send more emails
explaining the faults of retarded
programmers and serious vulnerabilities, and then link to an owasp
page.

Can you explain HTTPOnly cookies to me? I will only accept your
explanation if you can justify an impact of Critical, a likelihood of
High and a severity of High?

fuq'in kidz...

On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 11:20 PM, Gökhan Muharremoğlu
 wrote:
>
> This article explains how this vulnerability works with Session
Fixation
> attack.
>
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Session_Fixation_(OWASP-SM-003)
>
>> From: gokhan.muharremoglu@...ec.org
>> To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
>> Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2012 11:34:11 +0300
>> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Predefined Post Authentication Session
ID
>> Vulnerability
>
>>
>> Vulnerability Name: Predefined Post Authentication Session ID
>> Vulnerability
>> Type: Improper Session Handling
>> Impact: Session Hijacking
>> Level: Medium
>> Date: 10.07.2012
>> Vendor: Vendor-neutral
>> Issuer: Gokhan Muharremoglu
>> E-mail: gokhan.muharremoglu@...ec.org
>>
>>
>> VULNERABILITY
>> If a web application starts a session and defines a session id
before a
>> user
>> authenticated, this session id must be changed after a successful<
br>>
>> authentication. If web application uses the same session id before
and after
>
>> authentication, any legitimate user who has gained the "before
>> authentication" session id can hijack future "after authentication"
>> sessions
>> too.
>>
>>
>> Vulnerable Login Page & Session ID before Authentication
>> (Status-Line) HTTP/1.1 200 OK
>> Server Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
>> Set-Cookie PHPSESSID=8usd2oeo11a8cod9q3lnev9je2; path=/
>> Expires Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
>> Cache-Control no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0,
>> pre-check=0
>> Pragma no-cache
>> Content-Type text/html
>> Content-Length 308
>> Date Tue, 10 Jul 2012 06:16:57 GMT
>> X-Varnish 1922993981
>> Age 0
>> Via 1.1 varnish
>> Connection keep-alive
>>
>>
>> Vulnerable Login Page & Authentication Request
>> (Request-Line) POST /io sec_login_vulnerable.php HTTP/1.1
>
>> Host www.iosec.org
>> User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; tr;
rv:1.9.2.25)
>> Gecko/20111212 Firefox/3.6.25 ( .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET4.0E)
>> Accept
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
>> Accept-Language tr-tr,tr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
>> Accept-Encoding gzip,deflate
>> Accept-Charset ISO-8859-9,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
>> Keep-Alive 115
>> Connection keep-alive
>> Referer http://www.iosec.org/iosec_login_vulnerable.php
>> Cookie PHPSESSID=8usd2oeo11a8cod9q3lnev9je2
>> Content-Type application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>> Content-Length 42
>> POST DATA
>> user gokhan
>> pass muharremoglu
>> submit Login
>>
>>
>> Vulnerable Login Page & Session ID after Authentication
>> (Status-Line) HTTP/1.1 200 OK
>> Server Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
>> Set-Cookie PHPSESSID=8usd2oeo11a8cod9q3lnev9je2; path=/
>> Expires Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
>> Cache-Control no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0,
>> pre-check=0
>> Pragma no-cache
>> Content-Type text/html
>> Content-Length 308
>> Date Tue, 10 Jul 2012 06:16:57 GMT
>> X-Varnish 1922993981
>> Age 0
>> Via 1.1 varnish
>> Connection keep-alive
>>
>>
>> MITIGATION
>> To avoid this vulnerability, sessions must be regenerated after a
>> successful
>> login. In a session fixation attack, attacker fixates (sets)
another
>> person's (victim's) session identifier because of "never
regenerated and
>> validated" session id and this vulnerability can also lead to the
Session
>> Fixation attack.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Full-Discl osure - We believe in it.
>
>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/