+----------------------------------------------------------------+
| XADV-2013003 Linux Kernel fbdev Driver arcfb_write() Overflow  |
+----------------------------------------------------------------+

 Vulnerable versions:
 - linux kernel 3.12 <=
 - linux kernel 2.6.x

 Testbed: linux kernel 2.6.18
 Type: Local
 Impact: Kernel Panic
 Vendor: http://www.x90c.org
 Author: x90c <geinblues *nospam* gmail dot com>
 Site: x90c.org


=========
ABSTRACT:
=========

The fbdev driver is frame buffer driver for arc monochrome lcd
board in the linux kernel. 

The linux kernel driver has a overflow vulnerability because
the codes at arcfb_write(). When if large value as the parameter
to the arcfb_write() it will be overflow to lead the kernel panic.

The large 0xffffffff copy_from_user() lead to the kernel panic. [1]

* reference:
  [1] http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/362953/30/0/threaded
  [2] http://zerryloveyou.blog.com/2010/12/27/linux-lcd-driver-writing/


=========
DETAILS:
=========


1. Vulnerable arcfb_write()

Arbitrary user can control count, ppos variable both. The ppos must
not be larger value than fbmemlength variable (exp cond 3) and
the count + p also not be larger than fbmemlength (exp cond 4).
a little value p, large value to 0xffffffff count can be reached
the copy_from_user(). 0xffffffff bytes copied and kernel panic!

[linux-2.6.18-kdb/drivers/video/arcfb.c]
----
/*
 * this is the access path from userspace. they can seek and write to
 * the fb. it's inefficient for them to do anything less than 64*8
 * writes since we update the lcd in each write() anyway.
 */
static ssize_t arcfb_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count,
                loff_t *ppos) // XXX unsigned count If exp cond 1) count==0xffffffff
{
    /* modded from epson 1355 */

    struct inode *inode;
    int fbidx;
    struct fb_info *info;
    unsigned long p;	// unsigned long.
    int err=-EINVAL;
    unsigned int fbmemlength,x,y,w,h, bitppos, startpos, endpos, bitcount;
    struct arcfb_par *par;
    unsigned int xres;

    p = *ppos; // XXX p = *ppos	If exp cond2) p=0xfff
    inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
    fbidx = iminor(inode);
    info = registered_fb[fbidx]; // XXX info = registered frame buffer.

    if (!info || !info->screen_base)
        return -ENODEV;

    par = info->par;
    xres = info->var.xres;
    fbmemlength = (xres * info->var.yres)/8;

    if (p > fbmemlength) // If exp cond3) fbmemlength > 0xfff.
        return -ENOSPC;

    err = 0;

    /* XXX exp cond 4) 0xffffffff+0xfff=0xffe > fbmemlength? no. */
    if ((count + p) > fbmemlength) {
        count = fbmemlength - p;
        err = -ENOSPC;
    }

    if (count) { // XXX count?
        char *base_addr;

        base_addr = info->screen_base;
        count -= copy_from_user(base_addr + p, buf, count); // XXX 0xffffffff bytes copied. (kernel panic!)

...

}

static struct fb_ops arcfb_ops = {
    .owner      = THIS_MODULE,
    .fb_open    = arcfb_open,
    .fb_write   = arcfb_write,	// arcfb_write() for the driver's write.
    .fb_release = arcfb_release,
    .fb_pan_display = arcfb_pan_display,
    .fb_fillrect    = arcfb_fillrect,
    .fb_copyarea    = arcfb_copyarea,
    .fb_imageblit   = arcfb_imageblit,
    .fb_ioctl   = arcfb_ioctl,
};
----


2. fb_info struct.

----
struct fb_info {
    int node;

...


    char __iomem *screen_base;  /* Virtual address */

    unsigned long screen_size;  /* Amount of ioremapped VRAM or 0 */ XXX
    void *pseudo_palette;       /* Fake palette of 16 colors */
#define FBINFO_STATE_RUNNING    0
#define FBINFO_STATE_SUSPENDED  1
    u32 state;          /* Hardware state i.e suspend */
    void *fbcon_par;                /* fbcon use-only private area */
    /* From here on everything is device dependent */
    void *par;
};
----

base_addr variable to copy dest pointer is the char __iomem *.
and it can be overflowed.


===============
EXPLOIT CODES:
===============
-


=============
PATCH CODES:
=============
-


===============
VENDOR STATUS:
===============
2013/11/10 - I discovered the vulnerability.
2013/11/11 - The advisory released.


============
DISCLAIMER:
============

The authors reserve the right not to be responsible for the topicality,
correctness, completeness or quality of the information provided in this
document. Liability claims regarding damage caused by the use of any information
provided, including any kind of information which is incomplete or incorrect,
will therefore be rejected.